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THE ENDURING ENIGMA OF PUBLIC 
OFFICIAL STATUS IN LIBEL LAW 
Nat Stern*
          Under Supreme Court nomenclature, a public employee is not 
necessarily a “public official” as that term is used in constitutional 
defamation doctrine. The distinction is crucial, for only those 
governmental employees characterized as public officials must meet the 
typically insurmountable burden of proving that the defendant acted with 
actual malice: i.e., knowledge that the defendant’s statement about the 
plaintiff was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
For over a half-century, the Court’s decision in Rosenblatt v. Baer has 
been the dominant authority to which courts have looked in determining 
public official status, and Garrison v. Louisiana the principal guide for 
deciding whether a specific libelous statement falls within the scope of 
the privilege. Decades of judicial experience applying these authorities, 
however, have left significant inconsistencies among courts, uncertainty 
to individual litigants, and grist for criticism that the range of comment 
on government employees subject to the actual malice rule has been 
stretched beyond the bounds originally contemplated by the Court. Any 
of these developments might induce the Court to revisit and revise the 
doctrine governing defamation of public employees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 the United States Supreme 
Court famously ruled that the First Amendment 
require[s] . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false 
or not.2 
The Court, however, did not spell out the category of public 
employees who qualified as public officials for purposes of imposing 
the actual malice requirement.3 That doctrinal gap was ostensibly later 
filled, in substantial part, two years later in Rosenblatt v. Baer.4 Over 
a half-century after Rosenblatt, however, legions of cases addressing 
this question have not displayed a consistent collective approach to 
interpreting Rosenblatt’s criteria for public official status. Indeed, in 
some instances courts have relied little or not at all on the Court’s 
ruling. 
This Article examines themes arising from judicial efforts to give 
substance to the Court’s indications of when persons holding 
governmental positions must demonstrate actual malice. Part I 
describes the Court’s pronouncements on this determination as well as 
the extent to which lower courts have arguably adhered to a more 
expansive notion than the Court envisioned. Part II reviews 
contradictory holdings among courts—especially in the realm of 
education—resulting from the malleability of the Court’s guiding 
principles. Exploring another facet of imprecision in this area, Part III 
discusses the sometimes-hazy line drawn between public officials and 
public figures, and the impact of this blurred boundary on courts’ 
public official analysis. Part IV assesses attempts to bring more 
coherence and predictability to the designation of public officials as 
well as limitations on such efforts. 
 
 1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2. Id. at 279–80. 
 3. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 4. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). See infra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
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I.  THE PERVASIVE EQUATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC 
OFFICIAL STATUS 
The problem of public official classification arises in the context 
of an oft-criticized body of defamation doctrine.5 Bringing defamation 
within constitutional cognizance,6 New York Times launched the 
Court’s extended project of reconciling the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free expression with society’s “pervasive and strong 
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”7 In the 
course of this enterprise, the Court developed rules establishing 
variable burdens of proof according to the nature of the plaintiff8 and 
subject of the defamatory statement.9 The Court also articulated 
interpretive principles to determine whether a statement constitutes a 
 
 5. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1056–57 
(2006) (charging that defamation law “gives us the worst of worlds”); Joshua B. Orenstein, 
Comment, Absolute Privilege from Defamation Claims and the Devaluing of Teachers’ 
Professional Reputations, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 261, 267 (characterizing American defamation law 
as “a hodgepodge of complex and contradictory standards”); Mark P. Strasser, A Family Affair? 
Domestic Relations and Involuntary Public Figure Status, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 69, 70 
(2013) (“The Court’s inability to adopt a coherent rationale combined with its unwillingness to 
apply the criteria that it has announced have made this area of the law chaotic.”); Jeffrey I. 
Greenwood, Note, Group Defamation, Power, and a New Test for Determining Plaintiff Eligibility, 
28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 871, 878 (2018) (describing American defamation 
law as “notorious for inconsistencies and complexity”). 
 6. The New York Times Court declared that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from 
constitutional limitations.” N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 269. With this proclamation, the Court 
effectively disavowed its earlier refusal to recognize defamation as a category of speech shielded 
by the First Amendment. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256–57, 266 (1952) (deeming 
defamatory statements outside the bounds of First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (dictum) (Defamation forms “no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
 7. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86). 
 8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs designated 
as private figures were not required to meet the actual malice standard imposed on public officials 
and public figures). Gertz is discussed at infra notes 305–313 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756–61 (1985) 
(plurality opinion) (clarifying that private figure plaintiff need not establish actual malice to recover 
presumed or punitive damages where defamatory statement does not involve matter of public 
concern). 
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defamatory falsehood10 and issued guidance on the proper disposition 
of libel litigation.11 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Limited Guidance 
Lower courts determining whether a public employee must 
surmount the formidable barrier12 of the actual malice standard have 
looked primarily to language found in New York Times, Rosenblatt, 
and Garrison v. Louisiana.13 New York Times not only promulgated 
the actual malice requirement for public officials but also explained 
the principles that animated its adoption.14 In Rosenblatt, one finds the 
Court’s fullest (though not comprehensive) expression of the means 
for ascertaining public official status. Garrison—though perhaps not 
intentionally—opened the door to a wide-ranging conception of 
statements about public officials that would trigger the actual malice 
rule. 
Unsurprisingly, the New York Times Court did not elaborate on 
the contours of the public official category because the plaintiff in that 
case was so obviously a member.15 Instead, the Court was largely 
occupied with justifying its radical transformation of the common-law 
 
 10. Accusations that in context amount to rhetorical hyperbole, for example, will not incur 
liability based on their literal meaning. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 
296 (1974) (referring to plaintiffs as “traitors”); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 
6, 13 (1970) (charging plaintiffs with “blackmail”). Suits will likewise be rejected where the 
statement at issue cannot reasonably be understood as “of and concerning” the plaintiff. Rosenblatt, 
383 U.S. at 82–83; N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 288–92. Further, deliberate alteration of quotations 
attributed to the plaintiff is protected unless it materially changes the meaning conveyed by the 
plaintiff’s actual words. See Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). Finally, 
to be actionable, statements must be susceptible to being proved false. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 
19–20. (This principle, however, does not apply to statements—even if denominated as 
“opinion”—that imply false assertions of defamatory fact.). 
 11. E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1986) (ruling that a 
defendant is entitled to summary judgment when a public figure’s opposing affidavit fails to support 
a reasonable inference of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence). 
 12. Just how difficult an obstacle the actual malice rule poses was partly clarified four years 
after New York Times when the Court presented a relatively narrow notion of what qualifies as 
“reckless disregard” by a defendant. Neither a failure to investigate the truth of a defamatory 
statement nor animosity toward the plaintiff rises to this level. Rather, the Court demanded 
“sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see also 
Susan M. Gilles, From Baseball Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the Risk in Tort Law 
and Constitutional Libel Law, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 231, 232 n.1 (2002) (noting the conclusion by 
scholars that actual malice “dooms” plaintiff success). 
 13. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 14. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 282. 
 15. See id. at 292. 
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regime of libel.16 The case involved a libel suit over a civil rights 
fundraising advertisement in the New York Times that contained a 
number of minor inaccuracies in its criticism of the Montgomery 
Police Department.17 The plaintiff, a Montgomery County 
Commissioner, recovered damages in state court on the theory that the 
advertisement’s allegations of police misconduct effectively charged 
him with abuse of his authority in his capacity as the commissioner 
who supervised the police department.18 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court ruled that even if the accusations could be understood as 
referring to Sullivan,19 the evidence was insufficient to prove with 
“convincing clarity” that any of the defendants had acted with actual 
malice.20 
The actual malice rule itself rested principally on two 
fundamental rationales. First, the First Amendment prizes at its core 
vigorous discussion of public issues untrammeled by interference by 
government censors. In Justice Brennan’s memorable proclamation 
for the Court, the First Amendment reflects “a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”21 Second, as an instrumental matter, 
the Court recognized that such debate would not take place unhindered 
without effective safeguards.22 To preserve in particular the ability to 
criticize government—the “central meaning”23 of the First 
Amendment—the availability of the defense of truth alone would not 
 
 16. For an overview of the common law of defamation, see Joel D. Eaton, The American Law 
of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. 
REV. 1349, 1351–64 (1975). 
 17. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 257–59. For example, though the police on three occasions 
were deployed in substantial numbers near the campus, they did not “ring” the campus as described 
in the advertisement. Id. at 259. 
 18. Id. at 257–58, 263–64. 
 19. The Court ultimately determined that the advertisement’s accusations could not be 
reasonably construed as being “of and concerning” New York Times. Id. at 288–92. 
 20. Id. at 285–88. 
 21. Id. at 270. This passage can be regarded as a descendent of Justice Holmes’s oft-quoted 
assertion that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas— . . . the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 22. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271–72. 
 23. Id. at 273. 
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suffice. Because factual errors are “inevitable in free debate,” they 
must be afforded a measure of protection to ensure that free expression 
has the “breathing space” it needs to survive.24 The actual malice rule 
would ensure that citizens critical of government would not be 
deterred from speaking out by the specter of strict accountability for 
their false statements.25 
Since the claim in New York Times so clearly involved a public 
official and his official conduct,26 the Court refrained from defining 
the scope of either term. The Court strongly suggested, however, that 
public officials comprise a subset of public employees when it 
declined “to determine how far down into the lower ranks of 
government employees the ‘public official’ designation would extend 
for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons 
who would or would not be included.”27 Similarly, the Court’s 
unwillingness to “determine the boundaries of the ‘official conduct’ 
concept”28 on this occasion implied that it would later draw parameters 
of relevant behavior. 
The Court’s reticence in New York Times to describe the 
qualifications for public official status gave way in Rosenblatt v. 
Baer.29 Although Rosenblatt did not provide a firm definition of the 
term, the Court offered what remains its most extensive guidance on 
identification of public officials. The case found a supervisor of a 
county ski resort to be a public official30 as conceived by the First 
Amendment.31 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court looked to the 
same considerations that had prompted application of the actual 
malice requirement to public officials in New York Times: 
There is, first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, 
and, second, a strong interest in debate about those persons 
who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution 
 
 24. Id. at 271–72 (internal citation omitted). 
 25. See id. at 279. 
 26. See id. at 271, 283 n.23. 
 27. Id. at 283 n.23. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
 30. The Court found it irrelevant that the plaintiff had left this position at the time of litigation 
because the column at issue commented on his performance in the post, and public interest in the 
manner in which he had carried out his duties remained strong. Id. at 87 n.14. See infra notes 102–
105 and accompanying text. 
 31. The Court rejected any suggestion that state-law standards could govern this question. 
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84. 
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of those issues. . . . Criticism of those responsible for 
government operations must be free, lest criticism of 
government itself be penalized.32 
Accordingly, designation as a public official would apply “at the 
very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who 
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or 
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”33 In a later passage, 
the Court stated that the designation would apply “[w]here a position 
in government has such apparent importance that the public has an 
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the 
person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the 
qualifications and performance of all government employees.”34 The 
Court did not address whether a plaintiff would have to meet both of 
these (potentially conflicting35) descriptions to be regarded as a public 
official or whether either could serve as an independent basis. It 
emphasized, however, that the determination would hinge exclusively 
on the nature of the position in question; “[t]he employee’s position 
must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the 
person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion 
occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.”36 Thus, a night 
watchman charged with stealing state secrets would not be compelled 
to prove actual malice simply because the accusation aroused public 
interest; imposing the rule in such circumstances would “virtually 
disregard society’s interest in protecting reputation.”37 Although this 
single example did not define the point in the governmental hierarchy 
at which public employees ceased to be deemed public officials, it 
gave substance to New York Times’s intimation that lower-level 
government employees would be excluded from the category.38 
The Court’s opinions after Rosenblatt that touched on public 
official status did little to clarify its meaning. While the Court ruled 
 
 32. Id. at 85. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 86. 
 35. See David Finkelson, Note, The Status/Conduct Continuum: Injecting Rhyme and Reason 
into Contemporary Public Official Defamation Doctrine, 84 VA. L. REV. 871, 882 (1998) (noting 
situations in which the two criteria could produce different resolutions). 
 36. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 n.13. 
 37. Id. at 86–87 n.13. 
 38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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that rationales for imposing the actual malice requirement on public 
officials also applied to political candidates,39 other references to 
identification of public officials consisted of scattered and 
unrevelatory statements. In St. Amant v. Thompson,40 for example, the 
Court “accepted” the Louisiana Supreme Court’s determination that a 
deputy sheriff was a public official41 and overturned the verdict in his 
favor for failure to prove actual malice.42 The Court in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.,43 a case centering on the definition of public figures in 
libel suits,44 summarily dismissed the defendant’s additional 
contention that the plaintiff—a private attorney—was a public 
official.45 As one court bluntly commented, Gertz “does nothing to 
add to the definition of a public official.”46 Perhaps most fittingly, the 
Court observed in dictum in another case concerned with public figure 
status: “The Court has not provided precise boundaries for the 
category of ‘public official’; it cannot be thought to include all public 
employees, however.”47 
Even a court’s determination that a plaintiff falls within these 
vague boundaries,48 however, does not alone create the burden of 
showing actual malice. Under New York Times, the defamatory 
falsehood must relate to the plaintiff’s official conduct for the rule to 
apply.49 On its face, this element appears to substantially narrow the 
range of expression eligible for the privilege. Less than a year after 
New York Times, however, the Supreme Court in Garrison v. 
Louisiana,50 signaled that the category was not confined to 
commentary on a public official’s performance in office. Garrison, a 
Louisiana parish district attorney, had been convicted of criminal 
defamation for describing the parish’s criminal court judges as 
 
 39. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 270–72 (1971) (“[P]ublications concerning 
candidates must be accorded at least as much protection . . . as those concerning occupants of public 
office.”). 
 40. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
 41. Id. at 730. 
 42. Id. at 733. 
 43. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 44. See infra notes 305–313 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52. 
 46. Carroll v. Jones, 74 Va. Cir. 466 (2008). 
 47. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979). 
 48. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966) (“[I]t is for the trial judge in the first instance 
to determine whether” the plaintiff is a public official.). 
 49. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 50. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
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inefficient, lazy, overly absent due to excessive vacations, and 
sympathetic to certain kinds of criminals.51 Overturning the 
conviction, the Court might have construed the remarks as directly 
relating to the maligned judges’ official conduct. Instead, the Court 
rested its application of the actual malice standard on the broader 
justification that it “protects the paramount public interest in a free 
flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their 
servants.”52 Therefore, “anything which might touch on an official’s 
fitness for office is relevant.”53 
Whether or not this formulation “eviscerated the official conduct 
requirement,”54 it dramatically reduced the chances that a defendant 
might founder on the second prong of the New York Times test. The 
potential breadth of what might be considered as touching on fitness 
for office is suggested by Garrison’s insistence that this type of 
comment would not be precluded from privilege because of its impact 
on private aspects of an official’s life: 
The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely 
because an official’s private reputation, as well as his public 
reputation, is harmed. . . . Few personal attributes are more 
germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, 
or improper motivation, even though these characteristics 
may also affect the official's private character.55 
Such expansive implications appeared to be borne out by the 
Court’s sweeping decree in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy56 that “a charge 
of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never 
 
 51. Id. at 64–66. 
 52. Id. at 77. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Finkelson, supra note 35, at 889 (“In other words, basically everything about a public 
official was fair game.”). But see Jeffrey A. Plunkett, Comment, The Constitutional Law of 
Defamation: Are All Speakers Protected Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 158 (1983) (asserting that 
because of criteria for privileged comments imposed by New York Times and Garrison, the actual 
malice standard “does not create an open season on public officials”). 
 55. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 
(1974) (affirming the relevance and conception of fitness for office under Garrison). 
 56. 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). 
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be irrelevant to an official’s or a candidate’s fitness for office” for 
purposes of applying New York Times’s actual malice rule.57 
B.  Criticism 
However indefinite the Court’s instruction on the occasions when 
public employees must show actual malice, various commentators 
have found its outlines either insufficiently or overly protective of 
defamatory expression. Notably, the exclusion of lower-level 
government employees from the meaning of public official is regarded 
by some as an artificial constraint on the category. For example, 
Jeffrey Omar Usman has argued that the limitation contradicts both 
New York Times’s rationale of democratic self-governance58 and the 
First Amendment’s core protection of speech about the official 
conduct of government employees.59 By contrast, David Elder would 
construe restrictively Rosenblatt’s reference to “those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public 
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs.”60 Under Elder’s approach, public school 
teachers, ordinary police officers, and others whom he regards as low-
level employees would not be required to meet the actual malice 
standard.61 
A similar divergence of opinion marks the extent to which 
Garrison’s concept of “fitness for office” shields criticism of public 
officials beyond commentary on their conduct in office. Jeffrey 
 
 57. Id.; see also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (“[U]nder any 
test we can conceive, the charge that a local mayor and candidate for a county elective post has 
been indicted for perjury in a civil rights suit is relevant to his fitness for office.”). 
 58. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining Who 
Constitutes a Public Official, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 262–64 (2015). 
 59. See id. at 277–86. 
 60. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 61. See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 5:24, Westlaw (database 
updated Dec. 2020); see also Finkelson, supra note 35, at 873 (“Lower courts have not recognized 
that, in the context of lower-level government employees, the balance struck between the First 
Amendment interest in unbridled criticism of government and the states’ interest in providing 
redress to citizens who suffer defamatory falsehoods does not warrant full constitutional protection 
for such statements.”); Brian Markovitz, Note, Public School Teachers as Plaintiffs in Defamation 
Suits: Do They Deserve Actual Malice?, 88 GEO. L.J. 1953, 1962 (2000) (“In a sense, every public 
employee is a ‘public official’—but in the idiom of libel law, the term has a much narrower 
sweep.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1989)); 
Kate M. Adams, Comment, (Re)defining Public Officials and Public Figures: A Washington State 
Primer, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1172–73 (2000) (“[The] definition of public official should 
be appropriately narrow, in accordance with the importance of protecting reputation and the need 
to protect speech that is close to the political end of the continuum.” (emphasis added)). 
(9) 54.4_STERN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:39 PM 
1216 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1205 
 
 
Abramson has argued that the near-immunity conferred by the actual 
malice standard to report on officials’ private affairs discourages 
capable people from pursuing public office, distracts the public from 
focusing on public matters, and calls into question the press’s special 
role in holding government accountable.62 Others have also contended 
that the license for defamatory falsehood enabled by the “fitness for 
office” criterion strays too far from New York Times’s original 
limitation of protected libel to speech “relating to [an official’s] 
official conduct.”63 On the other hand, it has been argued that latitude 
to report on officials’ or candidates’ private lives—especially sexual 
misconduct—supplies valuable information to citizens about the 
moral character and other traits of those who govern them.64 
C.  Lower Courts’ Expansive Leanings 
Whether fittingly or excessively, lower courts, on the whole, have 
tended toward maximalist constructions of both the category of public 
officials and the content of speech about them sufficiently pertinent to 
activate the actual malice rule. This pattern was already conspicuous 
over thirty years ago.65 The chief distinction between these two 
 
 62. See Jeffrey Abramson, Full Court Press: Drawing in Media Defenses for Libel and 
Privacy Cases, 96 OR. L. REV. 19, 53–54 (2017); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, A Reverent 
Reflection of the Splendid Scholarship of Martin Redish—Does Reexamining Commercial Speech 
Shed Light on the Regrettable Reliance Upon Lie & Insult in Political Campaigns?, 25 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 921, 942 (2017) (“[T]o the extent reputational harms are inadequately 
compensated under New York Times Co., there will be ever greater reluctance for the highly 
qualified to stand for public election.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating 
Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious 
Falsehood, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 924 n.136 (1989) (“[T]he ‘official conduct’ element places 
virtually no limitation on the applicability of the actual malice rule in public officials’ defamation 
suits.”). 
 64. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public’s Right to Know: A 
National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630, 640 (1968) (“The electorate looks 
at its public officials in the round. A false accusation that an official possesses an inordinate number 
of pornographic books and magazines in his home may be more destructive of his public reputation 
than an allegation of incompetence or even dishonesty.”). 
 65. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic 
Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1567–68 (1987) (noting courts’ 
expansive interpretation of both requisites for actual malice requirement); id. at 1542 n.105 
(“[R]elatively few government related defamation plaintiffs have been held not to be public 
officials subject to the New York Times standard.”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 636 (1978) (“‘[P]ublic official’ now embraces virtually all persons 
affiliated with the government . . . .”). 
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components of the New York Times rule is that while courts have 
occasionally found a public employee plaintiff not to meet 
Rosenblatt’s description of public officials, rulings that the 
defamatory statement at issue bears an inadequate relationship to 
official conduct have been more unusual. 
1.  The Far-Reaching Class of Public Officials. 
While Rosenblatt’s criteria suggest that public official 
designation is an exceptional status to be affirmatively demonstrated, 
reported cases reflect almost the opposite presumption. Courts’ 
overwhelming inclination to label government employee libel 
plaintiffs public officials is evident not only by the proportion of 
holdings to this effect, but also by the range of bases for reaching this 
conclusion. Defendants enjoy a variety of means by which they can 
persuade courts that plaintiffs “have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs,”66 or that the plaintiff’s position “has such 
apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the 
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the 
general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all 
government employees.”67 
Illustrating this phenomenon are the different sources on which 
courts can rely to discern the functions and authority exercised by the 
government employee in question. In many instances, simple 
inspection of the plaintiff’s formal title and job description will 
convince the court to classify the plaintiff as a public official. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did exactly that in Baumback v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,68 noting that the official job 
descriptions for the three positions that Baumback had held were 
available to the public.69 Twenty years later, the same court stated that 
a county school board employee’s title of Director of Budget & 
Finance “implies substantial control over the school system’s budget 
and finances”—an implication corroborated by the position’s job 
description.70 Similarly, an Ohio court looked to the plaintiff’s 
 
 66. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 67. Id. at 86. 
 68. No. 97-2316, 1998 WL 536358 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 1998). 
 69. Id. at *4. 
 70. Horne v. WTVR, LLC, 893 F.3d 201, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2018). 
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responsibilities under state law as a city law director to conclude that 
he qualified as a public official under Rosenblatt.71 In Bienvenu v. 
Angelle,72 the Louisiana Supreme Court went no further than reciting 
the plaintiff’s title of parish Director of Public Welfare to determine 
that she qualified as a public official; the opinion contained no 
description—formal or otherwise—of the position.73 
In other cases, it has been plaintiffs’ own words that have stamped 
them as public officials who must show actual malice. Plaintiffs whose 
complaint offers an impressive picture of their duties—perhaps with a 
view toward heightening their stature and thus recovery for harm to 
reputation—may find their account invoked to cement their public 
official designation.74 Other assertions of the importance of their 
position have preceded their libel action and almost certainly did not 
anticipate the suit. In a case involving the director of a county capital 
improvements department, the court considered a letter the plaintiff 
had written to the county commissioners.75 The letter’s 
characterization of its author’s wide-ranging authority and duties led 
the court to decide that he was a public official.76 When the former 
second-in-command of the New Orleans Levee Board Police brought 
a defamation claim, the court there also consulted his own version of 
his duties to determine his status for purposes of the litigation.77 As 
portrayed in the plaintiff’s earlier appeal of his dismissal, these duties 
were sufficiently extensive and important to persuade the court that he 
had been a public official.78 It is tempting to speculate that such 
plaintiffs’ robust description of their position in a non-libel context 
 
 71. See Lograsso v. Frey, 10 N.E.3d 1176, 1182 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 72. 223 So. 2d 140 (La. 1969), overruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 
So. 2d 163 (La. 1975). 
 73. See id. at 143. 
 74. See, e.g., Moorhead v. Millin, 542 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.V.I. 1982) (quoting plaintiff’s 
complaint describing his duties as Director of the Division of Utilities and Sanitation of the Virgin 
Islands Department of Public Works to include “complete responsibility and authority in the 
following areas: potable water distribution, solid waste collection and disposal, sanitary sewage, 
salt water supply, cemetery services, and utility systems services”). 
 75. Eubanks v. N. Cascades Broad., 61 P.3d 368, 373 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
 76. Id. at 372–74; see also Lovingood v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 800 F. App’x 840, 846 
(11th Cir. 2020) (basing determination that plaintiff was public official on his past statements about 
his responsibilities at NASA). 
 77. Landrum v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 685 So. 2d 382, 391 (La. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 78. See id. 
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includes a degree of self-serving exaggeration. If so, this indulgence 
of ego comes at the cost of erecting a daunting evidentiary barrier to 
recovery. 
For some courts, the duties and powers actually carried out by the 
plaintiff have been key to concluding that the plaintiff was a public 
official. As the Tennessee Supreme Court put it, “[t]he right of the 
press to criticize government and its agents is not bound by the niceties 
of titles or the legalistic definition of duties.”79 In deciding that a city 
hearing officer was a public official, a New Mexico court took notice 
that her performance in that role revealed that “[f]unctionally, Plaintiff 
was the decision making authority in semi-formal, quasi-judicial 
proceedings that involved the application of law . . . to the conduct of 
members of the public.”80 Similarly, whatever level of importance 
might be suggested by the title of assistant superintendent for business 
services of a school district, a Texas court ruled that the 
responsibilities undertaken by the plaintiff during his tenure in that 
position fit Rosenblatt’s conception of public officials.81 
In addition to multiple evidentiary channels for showing public 
official status, the variety of substantive grounds for deeming a 
plaintiff a public official offers ample opportunity for defendants to 
attain this strategic goal. A notable recurring basis for regarding 
plaintiffs as public officials is responsibility—sometimes rather 
limited—for the disposition of public funds. Execution of tax laws, for 
example, may almost automatically produce public official 
classification. Thus, a city’s collector of delinquent taxes82 and one of 
three appointed tax assessors of another city83 were ruled to be public 
officials with little elaboration. Similarly, courts appear strongly 
inclined to hold plaintiffs bearing the title financial officer—whether 
of a large school district84 or small county85—to fall within 
 
 79. Ferguson v. Union City Daily Messenger, Inc., 845 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tenn. 1992) 
(holding that plaintiff was a public official because his “duties throughout his employment by the 
County included substantial responsibility with regard to the financial and business affairs of the 
County”); see Lovingood, 800 F. App’x at 843 (deputy manager of NASA space shuttle projects 
office). 
 80. Reina v. Lin Television Corp., 421 P.3d 860, 865 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added). 
 81. See Beck v. Lone Star Broad., Co., 970 S.W.2d 610, 615 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 82. See Ryan v. Dionne, 248 A.2d 583, 585 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1968). 
 83. See Eadie v. Pole, 221 A.2d 547, 548–49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966). 
 84. See Fuller v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. B: 13-109, 2016 WL 3960563, at *13–14 
(S.D. Tex. May 18, 2016). 
 85. See Griffin v. Holden, 636 S.E.2d 298, 303–04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
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Rosenblatt’s contemplation. More broadly, plaintiffs who are 
“intimately involved in the expenditures of public funds”86 in general 
face a difficult task in avoiding designation as a public official. In this 
vein, a university purchasing agent who “handle[d] significant 
amounts of university funds,”87 a license tag agent involved in “the 
collection and accounting for substantial amounts of public funds,”88 
a regional Navy contractor with broad authority “to spend millions of 
dollars of Navy money,”89 and a director of financial aid at a state 
college,90 were all assigned public official status. Nor does a 
subordinate position of authority prevent its holder from being 
characterized as a public official. Plaintiffs involved in financial 
matters who “did not make decisions about how to spend funds,”91 
“lacked direct policy-making authority,”92 and “act[ed] upon receiving 
orders from . . . superiors”93 were each designated as a public official. 
In other realms, too, final decision-making authority is not 
requisite to classification as a public official. In New York, for 
example, a village building inspector responsible for making 
recommendations to the mayor as to whether building permit 
applications should be approved was ruled to hold a position “of such 
‘apparent importance’ that the general public . . . would have an 
‘independent interest’ in his ‘qualifications and performance.’”94 A 
Louisiana personnel coordinator in a parish office of the clerk of court 
whose recommendations for disciplining were resolved by higher 
authority, and who was considered “fairly equivalent” to thirty other 
supervisors in the office, was likewise held to be a public official.95 
Perhaps the clearest illustration that an advisory role does not preclude 
 
 86. Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 298 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (holding supervisory contract 
negotiator at Navy ships parts control center to be public official). 
 87. Davis v. Borskey, 660 So. 2d 17, 21 n.6 (La. 1995). 
 88. Hodges v. Okla. J. Publ’g Co., 617 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. 1980). 
 89. Carroll v. Jones, 74 Va. Cir. 466, 470 (2008). 
 90. Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 55–56 (Utah 1983). 
 91. Horne v. WTVR, LLC, 893 F.3d 201, 209 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 92. Coliniatis v. Dimas, 965 F. Supp. 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 93. Peterfish v. Frantz, 424 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 94. Dattner v. Pokoik, 437 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (App. Div. 1981) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). 
 95. Guzzardo v. Adams, 411 So. 2d 1148, 1149–50 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
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public official status is the consistency with which city attorneys have 
been deemed public officials.96 
If the ability only to recommend disciplinary measures can help 
confer public official status, then it is unsurprising that those wielding 
actual power to impose discipline and other sanctions are typically 
denominated public officials. In finding a fire captain to be a public 
official, a court highlighted the disciplinary power that he exercised 
over personnel at the firehouse.97 The power of a judge to mete out 
sentences would seem self-evidently to warrant classification as a 
public official. Perhaps that is why a juvenile court judge’s argument 
that he was not a public official—in a suit over remarks attributed to 
him in the course of a sentencing hearing—was rebuffed with little 
explanation beyond extensive recitation of passages from 
Rosenblatt.98 Further, the relevant disciplinary authority need not be 
exercised solely by the plaintiff to trigger public official designation. 
The former chairman of the Texas Medical Board’s disciplinary 
process review committee argued that he was not a public official 
because he could not control investigations against physicians or 
influence the process by which complaints against them were 
resolved.99 In rejecting this contention, the court emphasized that the 
Board had disciplinary authority that included suspension or 
revocation of a physician’s license.100 
Further heightening the likelihood of public official status is the 
absence of a strict requirement that plaintiffs hold government 
employment when the alleged defamatory falsehood is published. 
Accordingly, former officials suing over statements applicable to their 
time in office are generally required to prove actual malice.101 In one 
sense, this pattern is to be expected. Although Baer himself had left 
his position as supervisor of a county recreation area six months before 
 
 96. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Block, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 709–10 (Ct. App. 1980); Finkel v. Sun 
Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Wanless v. Rothballer, 503 N.E.2d 316, 
320 (Ill. 1986); Frink v. McEldowney, 275 N.E.2d 337, 337–38 (N.Y. 1971); Rogers v. Cassidy, 
946 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 97. See Miller v. Minority Brotherhood of Fire Prot., 463 N.W.2d 690, 695–96 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1990); see also Ewing v. City of Toledo, No. 18-cv-01626, 2020 WL 1845814, at *18 (D. Or. 
Feb. 21, 2020) (concluding that fire chief was public official). 
 98. See Simonson v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1261, 1267–68 (E.D. Wis. 1980). 
 99. Hotze v. Miller, 361 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex. App. 2012). 
 100. See id. at 714. 
 101. See Varner v. Bryan, 440 S.E.2d 295, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“Undoubtedly, a public 
official’s job performance will often continue to be the subject of important public debate and 
discussion long after the termination of his employment in a public office.”). 
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Rosenblatt’s column appeared,102 the Court still considered him a 
public official for purposes of the libel action.103 The Court 
emphasized that the area’s management “was still a matter of lively 
public interest; propositions for further change were abroad, and 
public interest in the way in which the prior administration had done 
its task continued strong.”104 At the same time, the Court 
acknowledged that a plaintiff could be “so far removed from a former 
position of authority that comment on the manner in which he 
performed his responsibilities no longer has the interest necessary to 
justify the New York Times rule.”105 Rosenblatt, then, did not appear 
to hold that the actual malice rule attached to public officials beyond 
their time in government indefinitely. Nevertheless, courts typically 
proceed as though they are acting upon such a premise. In Zerangue 
v. TSP Newspapers, Inc.,106 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals brushed aside the contention by a deputy sheriff and chief of 
detectives that the lapse of nearly six years since their discharge had 
transformed them into private figures.107 On the contrary, noted the 
court, it was aware of “no cases holding that public official status 
erodes with the passage of time.”108 In Pierce v. Capital Cities 
Communications, Inc.,109 the Third Circuit similarly dismissed the 
notion that an interval of three years between the plaintiff’s departure 
from public office and the broadcast in question negated his burden to 
demonstrate actual malice.110 Other courts have also treated the period 
between plaintiffs’ return to the private sector and publication of the 
offending expression as lacking significance.111 
 
 102. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 78 (1966). 
 103. Id. at 87. 
 104. Id. at 87 n.14. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 814 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 107. See id. at 1069. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 576 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 110. See id. at 510 n.67 (stating that passage of three years “did not, by itself, strip Pierce of his 
status as a ‘public official’”). 
 111. Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 (10th Cir. 2002); Conese v. Hamilton J.-
News, Inc., No. CA2000-09-189, 2001 WL 1004264, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2001); 
MediaOne, L.L.C. v. Henderson, 592 S.W.3d 933, 942 (Tex. App. 2019); Hill v. Stubson, 420 P.3d 
732, 739–40 (Wyo. 2018). 
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Going further, some courts have designated plaintiffs as public 
officials without their having held government employment at all. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: 
It is conceivable that an individual holding no formal public 
position, and standing in no employment or even contractual 
relationship with government, nevertheless may participate 
in some governmental enterprise to such an extent that the 
policies underlying New York Times Co. v. Sullivan . . . 
would demand that he or she be classified a public official.112 
More emphatically, a Texas court rejected the proposition that 
“the phrase ‘governmental employee,’ . . . was intended to limit it to 
those individuals who have a traditional ‘employer-employee’ 
relationship with a governmental entity.”113 Ruling that a court-
appointed psychologist testifying in a child custody dispute was a 
public official under Rosenblatt, the court declared the fact that the 
plaintiff held no formal public office to be “of no consequence.”114 
Similarly, a North Carolina court declared a physician retained by the 
state as a witness in a mental commitment proceeding to be a public 
official because his role held “the potential for great social harm if 
abused.”115 Extending this logic, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
determined that grand jurors, though concededly “private citizens . . . 
conscripted for the duty,” fit the profile of a public official.116 Because 
of a grand jury’s substantial powers—including indictment, 
investigation, and inquiries into prison conditions and possible public 
corruption—“the body must be considered governmental in nature.”117 
Moreover, in some instances, a plaintiff suing in a private capacity 
may nevertheless be deemed a public official because of that 
capacity’s connection to a governmental position held by the 
plaintiff.118 Thus, a New York court concluded that the president of a 
police labor union qualified as a public official because of the “nexus” 
between his union position and his status as a state trooper in a libel 
 
 112. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004, 1006 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Arctic Co. v. 
Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1980) (“There well may be circumstances in 
which a consultant employed by a government entity could be classified as a public official.”). 
 113. HBO v. Harrison, 983 S.W.2d 31, 38–39 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 114. Id. at 39. 
 115. Hall v. Piedmont Publ’g Co., 266 S.E.2d 397, 400 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). 
 116. Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 193 N.W.2d 139, 143–44 (Minn. 1971). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Stuart v. Porcello, 603 N.Y.S.2d 597, 599 (App. Div. 1993). 
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suit arising from his alleged misappropriation of union funds.119 
Finally, in a few cases, courts have not required the plaintiff to have 
any involvement in a government function to be considered a public 
official. An Illinois court, for example, inferred from the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the subject that the category includes one who “is 
participating in acts relating to matters in which the government has a 
substantial interest.”120 On this assumption, the court viewed as a 
public official a nursing home among whose patients were children 
with intellectual disabilities because of the public’s great interest in 
such individuals.121 
Where plaintiffs have actually been in government, courts have 
still often seemed to deviate from the Supreme Court’s indications that 
public official classification would not reach into the lower echelons 
of government.122 The term has been applied, for example, to an IRS 
agent,123 the manager of a community center,124 the administrator of a 
county motor pool,125 an HIV/AIDS case worker,126 a county license 
tag agent,127 and—frequently, though not invariably—public 
schoolteachers.128 In an especially vivid illustration of the 
designation’s reach, a court’s characterization of a university student 
senator as a public official rendered understatement another court’s 
assertion that “[i]t is not necessary that the government employee be 
near the top of the official hierarchy to be considered a public official 
for purposes of a defamation case.”129 Similarly expansive in approach 
is the Tennessee Supreme Court’s ruling that a junior social worker in 
a county human services office was a public official as intended by 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Drs. Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. E. Shore Newspapers, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1968). 
 121. Id. at 377. 
 122. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 123. Angel v. Ward, 258 S.E.2d 788, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). 
 124. Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Mo. 1969). 
 125. Clawson v. Longview Publ’g Co., 589 P.2d 1223, 1227–28 (Wash. 1979). 
 126. Harris v. Cochise Cnty., No. CIV 08-008-TUC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135275, at *54 
(D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 127. Hodges v. Okla. J. Publ’g Co., 617 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. 1980). 
 128. See infra Section II.A. 
 129. Luper v. Black Dispatch Publ’g Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1035–36 (Okla. Civ. App. 1983) 
(Means, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Rosenblatt.130 The decision is understandable in light of the potential 
impact of such workers on families’ lives, but it seems fair to ask 
whether the Rosenblatt Court had this kind of position in mind when 
referring to government employees who “have, or appear to the public 
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs.”131 More importantly, the Tennessee court’s 
definition of public official appears to leave relatively few persons in 
government outside its compass: those holding “[a]ny position of 
employment that carries with it duties and responsibilities affecting 
the lives, liberty, money or property of a citizen or that may enhance 
or disrupt his enjoyment of life, his peace and tranquility, or that of his 
family.”132 
Further implying a strong presumption of public official status are 
those cases in which courts forego explicit analysis of the question and 
proceed directly to applying the actual malice standard. In a libel suit 
brought by an assistant city manager, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
simply observed that a public official must prove actual malice by 
clear and convincing evidence.133 Similarly, the totality of a Georgia 
court’s discussion of the constitutional status of a board member of the 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) consisted of: 
“[T]he articles [giving rise to the suit] had reference to the plaintiff as 
a board member of MARTA, and he is a public official in serving in 
this capacity; hence he may recover for defamation only upon a 
showing of actual malice.”134 And in a case decided just five years 
after Rosenblatt, the Delaware Supreme Court without elaboration 
 
 130. Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tenn. 1978); see also Kahn v. Bower, 284 
Cal. Rptr. 244, 253 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that county social worker was public official); 
Villarreal v. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 131, 134–35 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding that 
child protective services specialist was public official). 
 131. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 132. Press, Inc., 569 S.W.2d at 441; see Eder v. N. Ariz. Consol. Fire Dist. No. 1, No. CV-19-
08101-PCT, 2020 WL 1307964, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2020) (“Arizona courts take an expansive 
view on what constitutes a public official, finding that police officers, teachers, narcotics agents, 
county sheriffs, ‘lower rung’ FAA inspectors, student senators, and IRS agents are all public 
officials.”); Schofield v. Gerda, No. 02-15-00326-CV, 2017 WL 2180708, at *12 (Tex. Ct. App. 
May 18, 2017) (Under Rosenblatt, “a ‘public official’ includes anyone who holds, by election or 
appointment, a public office.” (citation omitted)). 
 133. Brown v. K.N.D. Corp., 529 A.2d 1292, 1294 (Conn. 1987). 
 134. Murray v. Williams, 305 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
(9) 54.4_STERN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:39 PM 
1226 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1205 
 
 
pronounced it “settled law” that police officers are considered public 
officials under New York Times.135 
Of course, courts have not always treated government 
employment as tantamount to public official status. In taking the 
unusual step136 of refusing to consider a police officer a public official, 
the Iowa Supreme Court stated its disavowal of “the expansive view 
that all government employees are public officials as inconsistent with 
the plain meaning of the standards announced by the Supreme 
Court.”137 Under the same reasoning, the court also declined to 
recognize a fire fighter as a public official.138 Moreover, just as the 
court emphasized the “low-ranking” position of the plaintiff in each of 
these two cases,139 other courts among the minority rejecting public 
official status have underscored the modest level of the plaintiff’s 
position and power.140 While the unexceptional influence and 
visibility of a file clerk in a county sheriff’s office might seem self-
evident, a Kansas court took pains to spell out that the plaintiff holding 
this position “exercised no sovereign power or control over the 
exercise of governmental affairs.”141 By contrast, a county surveyor 
on the surface possesses a greater degree of responsibility and control; 
however, the Texas Supreme Court took notice of the plaintiff’s 
“minimal responsibilities” as a surveyor in finding that the actual 
malice standard did not apply.142 Even the vice-presidency of the state 
bar association did not create public official status, ruled the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, because the bar lacked formal 
authority to change the rules of that court.143 In a Florida case, a state 
agency’s coordinator, charged with investigating elder-care facilities 
accused of elder abuse, was not a public official “under the definition 
 
 135. Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971). The status of police officers is 
discussed at infra Section IV.A. 
 136. See infra Section IV.A. 
 137. Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 178 (Iowa 2004), overruled on other grounds by Alcala 
v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016). 
 138. Jones v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 895 (Iowa 1989). 
 139. See id.; Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d at 178. 
 140. See Sellars v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 684 P.2d 450, 453 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d, 
695 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1985); Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 583 (W. Va. 1992). 
 141. Sellars, 684 P.2d at 453. 
 142. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 814–15 (Tex. 1976). 
 143. Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 583. 
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of Rosenblatt.”144 The court reeled off several limitations on the 
coordinator’s authority to determine that this “mid-level employee” 
had modest responsibility for and “minimal control” over the 
operations of such facilities.145 Further noting that the plaintiff had 
received “little exposure in the general community,” the court 
concluded that his position did not call for “special public scrutiny” 
apart from the attention directed at him as a result of the allegedly 
defamatory articles and press releases.146 Finally, a California court 
held that a plaintiff whose position resembled that of Baer in 
Rosenblatt not to be a public official.147 Much as Baer had served as 
the supervisor of a county recreation area, the plaintiff had been a city 
recreation director.148 Without sufficient evidence of the nature of that 
position, however, the court assumed that it did not warrant public 
official status.149 
When the Garrison Court announced that any expression that 
“might touch on an official’s fitness for office”150 would find shelter 
in the actual malice requirement, it appeared to extend the category of 
relevant speech far beyond defamation obviously “relating to [the 
plaintiff’s] official conduct.”151 That expectation has been borne out 
by the overwhelming proportion of cases in which courts, having 
classified the plaintiff as a public official, have gone on to find the 
statement at issue to fall within the purpose of the actual malice rule. 
Critics and advocates alike agree that this second prong of the New 
York Times standard imposes little limitation on the category of 
defamatory speech that will obligate plaintiffs to prove actual 
malice.152 Or as one court put it, “So many things can ‘touch on’ 
 
 144. Wilkinson v. Fla. Adult Care Ass’n, 450 So. 2d 1168, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 145. See id. at 1172–73. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Peoples v. Tautfest, 79 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482 (Ct. App. 1969). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id.; see Porcari v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 856 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218–19 (App. 
Div. 2008) (“The position of associate corporation counsel [employed by city] is not a position of 
‘such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and 
performance of the person who holds it . . . .’” (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 
(1966))). 
 150. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). 
 151. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 152. Compare David Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer 
Criteria—A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 
BUFF. L. REV. 579, 648 (1984) (“The federal and state decisional law overwhelmingly follows the 
broad-gauged and almost all-encompassing delineation of relevance regarding ‘official conduct’ 
established by the Garrison, Monitor Patriot, and Ocala Star-Banner decisions.”), with Arlen W. 
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someone’s ‘fitness for office’ that this restriction to the actual malice 
standard is very rarely applied.”153 Little weight, then, has been given 
to Justice Goldberg’s caveat concurring in New York Times that “the 
Constitution [does not] protect[] defamatory statements directed 
against the private conduct of a public official.”154 
The elasticity of what may be thought germane to an official’s 
fitness for office is illustrated by the variety of statements about police 
officers that have been subjected to the actual malice standard. A 
Texas court articulated this philosophy: “The public perceives a police 
officer as an authority figure entrusted in upholding the law and 
possesses a legitimate interest in information related to his ability to 
follow the law and perform his duty to protect the public.”155 That 
information appears to encompass virtually all serious misconduct 
regardless of the capacity in which the officer was acting at the time 
of the alleged behavior. In a Georgia case, a sheriff said of a police 
investigator that the latter “broke up a family in town and was involved 
in an altercation in the city streets of Glennville with [the] jealous 
husband.”156 The court ruled that these statements concerned the 
plaintiff’s “qualifications for carrying out his position as a police 
officer.”157 Similarly, the First Circuit found a comment to the effect 
that an off-duty police officer had engaged in public drunkenness 
sufficiently related to her fitness for office to fall under the New York 
Times rule.158 The same was held true of accusations by neighbors of 
 
Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order 
from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 91, 138 (1987) (“The message of Garrison 
and Monitor Patriot is unmistakable and appropriate . . . . Virtually anything in the defendant’s 
statement that some members of the public could regard as bearing upon the public official’s or 
political candidate’s fitness for office should trigger operation of the actual malice rule in a 
defamation action brought by a public official or political candidate on the basis of such 
statement.”). 
 153. Dixon v. Int’l Brotherhood of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 88 (1st Cir. 2007); see also 
Horne v. WTVR, LLC, 893 F.3d 201, 209–10 (4th Cir. 2018) (commenting that the requirement 
that allegedly defamatory statement relate to plaintiff’s official conduct “is easily satisfied”). 
 154. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 155. Opaitz v. Gannaway Web Holdings, LLC, 454 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 156. Jessup v. Rush, 609 S.E.2d 178, 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (alteration in original). The 
sheriff also asserted that the plaintiff “doesn’t know a felony from a misdemeanor.” Id. However, 
this part of his comments was plainly relevant to the plaintiff’s qualifications and also presumably 
protected as an expression of opinion rather than a literal representation of fact. 
 157. Id. at 181. 
 158. See Dixon, 504 F.3d at 88. 
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an off-duty police detective that he had harassed neighbors with foul 
language, displayed a violent temper, threatened small children, 
kicked pets, and needlessly called the city police department.159 The 
Maine Supreme Court rejected the detective’s argument that New York 
Times did not apply because the charges did not pertain to his official 
responsibilities.160 Rather, the assertions’ aim of demonstrating that 
the detective should be barred from carrying his weapon to his 
residence “unquestionably impugns his ‘fitness for office.’”161 By 
comparison, allegations that a campus police officer on several 
occasions had committed “racist and homophobic behavior” explicitly 
called into question the officer’s fitness for his position; still, the Ohio 
court’s opinion finding such behavior relevant to his qualifications did 
not strictly confine its reasoning to the display of animus while 
performing official duties.162 It also did not matter to the Ohio 
Supreme Court that a police officer (erroneously) reported to have 
testified that he advised his nephew not to talk to investigators of a 
killing was not acting in his formal capacity in law enforcement. The 
court instead characterized the account of the testimony as dealing 
with “matters relevant to [the officer’s] fitness to be a public 
official.”163 
The principle that police officers’ misconduct committed out of 
uniform remains relevant to their fitness has been applied with 
particular stringency to accusations of personal abuse. Thus, a Texas 
court summarily concluded that a charge of sexual assault by an off-
duty officer triggered the actual malice requirement.164 Likewise, an 
accusation that a deputy sheriff engaged in “conduct amounting to 
domestic violence” was governed by the premise that “any conduct 
that might adversely affect [an official’s] fitness for public office” 
would fall within the New York Times rule.165 Nor need the alleged 
behavior rise to the level of violence for it to bear on the officer’s 
 
 159. See Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 759, 763 (Me. 1981). 
 160. Id. at 762–63. 
 161. Id. at 763. 
 162. See Waterson v. Cleveland State Univ., 639 N.E.2d 1236, 1237–39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
 163. Soke v. Plain Dealer, 632 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (Ohio 1994). 
 164. See Opaitz v. Gannaway Web Holdings, LLC, 454 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App. 2014). The 
court also noted the Supreme Court’s declaration that “a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how 
remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official’s fitness for office . . . .” Id. (quoting 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971)). 
 165. Murray v. Lineberry, 69 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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fitness. The plaintiff in a Missouri case—a reserve police officer and 
a customs inspector—was described in letters by the defendant as 
having committed a series of acts that could be considered stalking or 
harassment.166 Dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that he was not 
performing official duties as a customs inspector or police officer at 
the time of the alleged acts, the court countered that “[c]omments 
bearing on the private conduct of a police officer may touch on the 
officer’s fitness to hold office.”167 
Of course, police officers represent just one example of public 
officials who must show actual malice to recover for statements not 
directed at their performance in office. The Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy168 that charges of 
criminal conduct are always relevant to fitness for office169 has proved 
particularly potent grounds for requiring holders of various 
government positions to demonstrate actual malice. On this basis, both 
a school board member incorrectly identified as a rape suspect170 and 
a judge accused of committing fraud as an attorney a decade before 
his appointment to the bench171 were held subject to the New York 
Times rule. Even an erroneous report that a mayor had committed 
trespass to retrieve lost cows enjoyed the protection of the actual 
malice standard because the offense constituted a misdemeanor under 
the state’s criminal code.172 Courts have invoked this principle as well 
in rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments that the defamatory content at issue 
involved “purely private matters” rather than official conduct.173 Such 
was the disposition by an Ohio court of a judge’s suit over an article 
stating that his wife had asserted in a divorce proceeding that he had 
 
 166. See Westhouse v. Biondo, 990 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (setting forth seven 
allegations, including assertions that plaintiff arranged to be allowed into defendant’s apartment 
and that he made a number of harassing telephone calls to defendant and her parents). 
 167. Id. at 71 (citing Shafer v. Lamar Publ’g Co., 621 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 168. 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). 
 169. Id.; see supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 170. Strong v. Okla. Publ’g Co., 899 P.2d 1185, 1188–89 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995). 
 171. DiSalle v. P.G. Publ’g Co., 544 A.2d 1345, 1348–49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), overruled on 
other grounds by Bd. of Supervisors of Willistown Twp. v. Main Line Gardens, Inc., 155 A.3d 39, 
45 (Pa. 2017). 
 172. See Savannah News-Press v. Whetsell, 254 S.E.2d 151, 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). 
 173. See Scaccia v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 867 N.E.2d 874, 879–80 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) 
(applying actual malice standard in suit by chief of criminal section of city’s law department to 
reports suggesting improper behavior by chief and his wife leading transfer of large sum to them 
by elderly neighbor). 
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beaten her.174 Responding to the judge’s contention that the actual 
malice rule was not germane because the article “related to his private 
life,” the court pointed to Monitor Patriot’s promulgation of the 
invariable relevance of charges of criminal conduct.175 
Moreover, courts also tend to rely on the “fitness for office” 
rationale to apply the New York Times rule to allegations of behavior 
that is disturbing though not expressly criminal. When the chairman 
of a state highway board brought suit over articles purportedly 
charging him with “intimidating business tactics,” the court dismissed 
his argument that the actual malice rule was inapt on the sweeping 
ground that “the reporting of the plaintiff’s private business activities, 
regardless of their relationship in time to his holding office, fall within 
the New York Times rule where facts show his integrity, qualifications, 
compassion, honesty, ethics, or ‘anything which might touch on an 
official’s fitness for office.’”176 And in a case of mistaken identity, a 
state senate majority leader was falsely linked to “alleged 
improprieties” by a city’s Olympic bid committee; the court ruled that 
if the allegations had been true, they would have borne on the 
plaintiff’s “fitness for office and his public stewardship as Senate 
Majority Leader.”177 
Admittedly, instances can be found of rulings that defamatory 
statements were insufficiently connected with plaintiffs’ official 
position to warrant application of the New York Times rule. Such cases 
of “pure” disjunction between the nature of a falsehood and a public 
official's performance, however, are rare and typically involve 
idiosyncratic circumstances. In Cox v. Hatch,178 a group of postal 
employees posed with Senator Hatch for a picture that they alleged 
had been included in his campaign materials in a manner that 
implicitly and falsely conveyed their endorsement of him.179 
Observing that the political flier at issue “did not raise any issues at all 
about the efficiency or integrity of either the postal service or any of 
its employees,” the Utah Supreme Court deemed the employees 
“private plaintiffs” for the purpose of their libel suit.180 In DeLuca v. 
 
 174. Harris v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 532 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Johnson v. Cap. City Press, Inc., 346 So. 2d 819, 821–22 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
 177. Peterson v. N.Y. Times Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2000). 
 178. 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). 
 179. Id. at 558. 
 180. Id. at 560. 
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New York News, Inc.,181 a retiring public schoolteacher brought suit 
over an article reporting that he had accepted health leave benefits to 
which he was not entitled.182 As in Cox, the court determined that the 
article “did not relate to the qualifications or performance” of the 
plaintiff's duties as a teacher; indeed, this kind of claim could be made 
against any public employee.183 
In other cases, however, courts have avoided imposing the actual 
malice standard on public officials by essentially ignoring Garrison’s 
“fitness for office” grounds and focusing narrowly on a literal version 
of New York Times’s requirement that the defamatory falsehood 
“relat[e] to [the public official’s] official conduct.”184 A Washington 
court acknowledged as much in declining to apply the actual malice 
rule to a police officer suing over a broadcast stating that he had been 
seen in a “compromising position” with the wife of another man.185 
Though conceding that the allegation might bear on the plaintiff’s 
fitness for the vice squad on which he served, the court found 
dispositive that it did “not relate to his official duties or to his 
performance of those duties.”186 A similarly cabined inquiry marked 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Michaelis v. CBS, 
Inc.187 Michaelis, a county coroner, brought suit over a broadcast 
raising questions about her competence in performing an autopsy at 
the invitation of a neighboring county.188 While such criticism would 
seem to bear directly on her fitness as a county coroner, the Eight 
Circuit’s refusal to apply the New York Times rule hinged on the 
formality that here she was hired as a private physician rather than 
serving in an official capacity in the other county.189 
In a few cases, a determination that the defendant’s statement was 
insufficiently relevant because it did not relate to official conduct—
even though it might shed light on the plaintiff’s fitness for office—
serves as a kind of backstop to the court’s perhaps unconfident holding 
 
 181. 438 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1981). 
 182. Id. at 200–01. 
 183. Id. at 204. 
 184. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 185. Himango v. Prime Time Broad., Inc., 680 P.2d 432, 435–36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
 186. Id. at 436. 
 187. 119 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 188. Id. at 699–700. 
 189. Id. at 702. 
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that the plaintiff was not a public official to begin with. Having found 
the vice-president of the state bar association not to be a public official, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals went on to consider 
whether the actual malice standard would apply “even if” the plaintiff 
qualified for public official status.190 The libel suit arose from an 
editorial accusing the plaintiff of unethical behavior in his 
representation of a client191—surely conduct that bore on his fitness 
for the bar association’s vice-presidency. Nevertheless, the court ruled 
the charge beyond the bounds of actual malice protection on the 
ground that the editorial referred to the plaintiff in his capacity as a 
private attorney but not as a public official.192 In a Texas case, that 
state’s Supreme Court followed a similar analytical progression. After 
determining that a county surveyor qualified as a public official,193 the 
court proceeded to hold that the article at issue did not touch on the 
plaintiff’s fitness for his position.194 The article incorrectly reported 
that the plaintiff, acting as a consultant, had platted an area of the 
county that flooded; to the plaintiff, the false statement in context 
insinuated that he performed shoddy work.195 This appeared to be 
another instance in which the libelous assertion (if true) would be of 
interest to someone assessing the plaintiff’s fitness for the public 
office that he held. Here too, however, the court ruled that the absence 
of reference to the plaintiff’s position in government meant that the 
allegedly libelous statements did not relate to the plaintiff’s “official 
conduct” and therefore the actual malice rule was inapplicable.196 
II.  CONTRADICTIONS 
Notwithstanding the dominant judicial tendency to treat public 
employee libel plaintiffs as public officials, in some areas, courts have 
diverged in their classifications of some kinds of employees. The 
Supreme Court tacitly recognized this possibility when it 
acknowledged that it had “not provided precise boundaries for the 
 
 190. Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 583 (W. Va. 1992); see supra note 143 
and accompanying text. 
 191. See Hinerman, 423 S.E.2d at 566–67. 
 192. See id. at 583. 
 193. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 814–15 (Tex. 1976); see supra text 
accompanying note 142. 
 194. Foster, 541 S.W.2d at 814–15. 
 195. Id. at 811. 
 196. Id. at 815. 
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category of ‘public official.’”197 To critics, however, such variation 
more harshly demonstrates the vagueness and manipulability of 
Rosenblatt’s standard.198 However the phenomenon is characterized, 
it is especially visible among two types of employees: educators at 
public institutions and what might be considered hybrid employees 
whose activities entail a mix of public and private responsibilities. 
A.  Educators 
In 1990, a commentator lamented inconsistency among courts on 
the question of public educators’ status as plaintiffs in libel suits.199 
Thirty years later, a consensus on this issue remains elusive. The most 
notable discussion of the topic on the Supreme Court appears in 
Justice Brennan’s dissent from a denial of certiorari in Lorain Journal 
Co. v. Milkovich.200 Justice Brennan argued that public 
schoolteachers’ status as public officials “follows a fortiori from” 
Rosenblatt.201 He emphasized that teachers have “an opportunity to 
influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political 
process, and a citizen's social responsibilities,”202 and noted the 
Court’s observation in a previous case that “public school teachers 
may be regarded as performing a task ‘that go[es] to the heart of 
representative government.’”203 Some courts have embraced Justice 
Brennan’s conclusion that the designation of public schoolteachers as 
public officials flows from Rosenblatt’s reasoning. In the absence of a 
more authoritative source, however, a substantial number of decisions 
have refused to require public schoolteachers to show actual malice. 
The most straightforward basis for regarding public 
schoolteachers as public officials under Rosenblatt is that theirs is a 
 
 197. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979). 
 198. See, e.g., Finkelson, supra note 35, at 882–83 (“[E]ach criterion [of Rosenblatt] is 
sufficiently elastic to permit different findings when applied to the same class of public official.”); 
see also Plunkett, supra note 54, at 157 (“[Rosenblatt] does not provide a clear demarcation 
between public officials and mere public employees.”). 
 199. See generally Richard E. Johnson, No More Teachers’ Dirty Looks—Now They Sue: An 
Analysis of Plaintiff Status Determination in Defamation Actions by Public Educators, 17 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 761 (1990) (analyzing state court defamation cases with public educators as plaintiffs). 
 200. 474 U.S. 953 (1985). 
 201. Id. at 958 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 959. 
 203. Id. at 958 (alteration in original) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75–76 
(1979)). 
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position that “has such apparent importance that the public has an 
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the 
person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the 
qualifications and performance of all government employees.”204 This 
was the central theme of the oft-cited decision in Basarich v. 
Rodeghero.205 The court declared that “[p]ublic school systems . . . are 
consistent subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity” 
and “[p]ublic school teachers . . . and [their] conduct . . . and . . . 
policies[] are of as much concern to the community as are other ‘public 
officials.’”206 In a similar assessment, a Connecticut court asserted that 
“[u]nquestionably, members of society are profoundly interested in 
the qualifications and performance of the teachers who are responsible 
for educating and caring for the children in their classrooms.”207 More 
tersely, an Arizona court pronounced teachers public officials simply 
on the authority of Basarich without elaboration.208 In Oklahoma and 
Tennessee as well, it has been established that public school teachers 
are regarded as public officials when bringing libel actions.209 
Conversely, courts that reject the label of public official for public 
schoolteachers generally emphasize Rosenblatt’s description of the 
category as including “those among the hierarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
affairs.”210 Perhaps the most influential decision taking this stance was 
issued by a California court in Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective 
Order of Elks.211 According to the court, “[t]he governance or control 
which a public classroom teacher might be said to exercise over the 
conduct of government is at most remote and philosophical.”212 Also 
minimizing public schoolteachers’ control, the Maine Supreme 
 
 204. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). 
 205. 321 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). 
 206. Id. at 742. 
 207. Kelley v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (Conn. 1992). 
 208. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). 
 209. See Luper v. Black Dispatch Publ’g Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Okla. Civ. App. 1983) 
(citing Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978)); Campbell v. 
Robinson, 955 S.W.2d 609, 611–12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); see also Corbally v. Kennewick Sch. 
Dist., 973 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (declaring conduct attributed to public 
schoolteacher as “that of a public official”). 
 210. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 211. 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979). 
 212. Id. at 136. 
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Judicial Court in True v. Ladner213 ruled that the “very limited” 
authority they exercise did not warrant treating them as public 
officials.214 The court’s opinion included a reference to Nodar v. 
Galbreath,215 in which the Florida Supreme Court summarily declined 
to characterize a public high school teacher as a public official.216 
Citing True in turn, a New York appeals court even more succinctly 
announced that a public school teacher “should not be considered a 
public official.”217 Courts in Idaho, Texas, and Virginia, too, have 
concluded that public schoolteachers do not meet the criteria for public 
officials.218 Sharp criticism of decisions holding that public 
schoolteachers are not public officials219 does not appear to have 
affected courts in these states. 
Like teachers, athletic coaches have been both assigned to and 
excluded from the category of public officials.220 In Basarich, the 
classification of coaches as public officials was considered a corollary 
of the broader community interest in public school systems that also 
assigned this status to teachers.221 In Johnston, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court echoed Basarich in finding a middle school wrestling coach to 
be a public official: “[W]e can think of no higher community 
involvement touching more families and carrying more public interest 
than the public school system. This includes the athletic program.”222 
 
 213. 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Gomes 
v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 41–42 (D. Me. 2005). 
 214. Id. 
 215. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in Linafelt v. Beverly Enters.-
Fla., Inc., 745 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 216. Id. at 808. 
 217. Dec v. Auburn Enlarged Sch. Dist., 672 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (App. Div. 1998) (citing True, 
513 A.2d at 264). 
 218. See Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653, 663 (Idaho 2019); Poe v. San Antonio Express-
News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. App. 1979); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 
362 S.E.2d 32, 37 (Va. 1987). 
 219. Johnson, supra note 199, at 776 (describing reasoning by which courts have determined 
that teachers are not public officials as “[a] sort of judicial shell game”); Peter S. Cane, Note, 
Defamation of Teachers: Behind the Times?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1191, 1198 (1988) (asserting 
that decisions relieving teachers of burden of showing actual malice results from “[a] fundamental 
misinterpretation of the threshold Rosenblatt inquiry”). But see Markovitz, supra note 61, at 1981 
(“Holding public school teachers, as public officials, to the actual malice standard is not consistent 
with the original intent of the category as established in New York Times.”). 
 220. Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). 
 221. See id. 
 222. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978). 
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While the plaintiff was employed as a teacher who volunteered to 
serve as a coach, the court expressly based its conclusion on the latter 
capacity.223 A Texas court was even more pointed in characterizing a 
high school head football coach as a public official. In Johnson v. 
Southwestern Newspaper Corp.,224 the court refused to hold that the 
plaintiff’s additional role as a classroom teacher made him a public 
official.225 Rather, “[a]s head football coach, Johnson filled a position 
of such importance that the public not only had, but exhibited, an 
independent interest in his qualifications and performance, 
transcending any interest shown in other employees of the school 
system.”226 
Other courts, however, have ascribed considerably less 
importance to the position of coach. Representative of this attitude is 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGuire v. 
Bowlin227 refusing to regard a high school basketball coach as a public 
official.228 Tracing the actual malice standard for public officials to the 
preservation of free discussion of public issues and those with the 
power to influence their resolution, the court dismissively observed 
that “basketball is not fundamental to democracy.”229 Hence, whatever 
emotional importance a community may attach to a high school 
basketball team, the issues that it raises “are not the sort of issues that 
the public has ‘a strong interest in debat[ing].’”230 A coach’s authority 
to “determine the strategy of a basketball team,” then, did not rise to 
the level of responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
government affairs that had persuaded the court to recognize public 
official status in previous cases.231 In O’Connor v. Burningham,232 the 
Utah Supreme Court likewise rejected the interest or passion aroused 
by a high school basketball coach as a valid gauge of the position’s 
constitutional importance.233 Rather, a coach’s actions and policies did 
 
 223. See id. 
 224. 855 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 225. Id. at 186. 
 226. Id. at 187. The court also noted Johnson’s position as the high school athletic director as 
grounds for finding him to be a public official, but appeared to indicate that his responsibilities as 
head football coach alone would have sufficed to consider him a public official. See id. at 186–87. 
 227. 932 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 2019). 
 228. Id. at 829. 
 229. Id. at 825 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)). 
 230. Id. at 826 (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85). 
 231. See id. 
 232. 165 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2007). 
 233. Id. at 1219. 
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not “affect in any material way the civic affairs of a community—the 
affairs most citizens would understand to be the real work of 
government.”234 Nor has this skepticism about the importance of 
coaches' functions been confined to secondary education. Though 
presumably in general more visible and impactful than their high 
school counterparts, college basketball coaches have also been ruled 
not to be public officials.235 
As to university educators more broadly, this represents still 
another area where courts have failed to reach consensus on public 
official status. This lack of uniformity may be attributed in part to 
“[t]he result in any particular case [being] fact-sensitive, turning on 
the particular duties and status of the professor in issue.”236 Even 
taking this variable into account, however, the more important factor 
seems to be divergence in approaches toward addressing this question. 
A Louisiana court, for example, found state university professors not 
to be public officials in mistaken reliance on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire237—a case in which the Court did 
not reach the question of whether the professor-cum-research director 
bringing suit was a public official.238 By contrast, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court summarily declared a law professor a public official 
but left ambiguous the weight assigned to the plaintiff’s additional role 
as the law school’s assistant dean.239 In a more nuanced analysis, a 
federal court ruled that among three university plaintiffs, a full 
 
 234. Id.; see also Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653, 663–64 (Idaho 2019) (rejecting public 
official status for high school teacher accused of inappropriate relationship with student whom he 
coached). 
 235. See Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1029–30 (D.C. 1990) (stating that interest evoked 
by coach “would not result, even in part, from the perception or reality that the coach had 
‘substantial responsibility for or control over governmental affairs’” and that coach’s impact on 
players “did not invest her position with a statute [sic] ‘invit[ing] public scrutiny and discussion . . . 
apart from . . . the particular charges in controversy’” (alteration in original) (omissions in original) 
(quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85, 87 n.13)); Grayson v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 436 P.2d 756, 762 
(Wash. 1967) (ruling that coach was not public official but qualified as public figure). 
 236. Fortenbaugh v. N.J. Press, Inc., 722 A.2d 568, 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 237. 443 U.S. 111 (1979); see Foote v. Sarafyan, 432 So. 2d 877, 880 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(citing Hutchinson as basis for determination that professors were not public officials); see also 
Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1304 (Miss. 1989) (acknowledging that Hutchinson Court did 
not decide whether Hutchinson was a public official but still citing case to support ruling that 
university professor bringing defamation action was not a public official). 
 238. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8. 
 239. See Gallman v. Carnes, 497 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Ark. 1973). 
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professor and a high-level administrator qualified as public officials 
but an assistant professor did not.240 On the other hand, rank was not 
discussed when another federal court rejected out of hand the 
possibility that a law professor suing his former wife (also a law 
professor) would be considered a public official.241 Conversely, a 
Texas court differed from the case of dueling law professors in both 
its analysis and result; it explained that a psychology professor lacked 
the responsibility, control, and apparent importance under Rosenblatt 
to be deemed a public official.242 In some instances courts have 
sidestepped altogether the determination of whether public university 
professors are public officials by subjecting them to the actual malice 
standard as public figures.243 
Finally, while one might expect agreement that public school 
principals possess sufficient responsibilities, control, and apparent 
importance to qualify them as public officials, here too courts have 
diverged.244 Even courts finding principals to be public officials have 
varied in the grounds on which they have reached this conclusion. In 
Williams v. Detroit Board of Education,245 the court determined that 
the public had an independent interest in the principal’s performance 
as set forth in Rosenblatt.246 The court, however, also appeared to both 
collapse the two prongs of the New York Times test and ignore the 
expansive “fitness for office” basis for finding defamatory comment 
relevant: “[P]rincipals are public officials to the extent their 
defamation claims involve communications relating to their conduct 
 
 240. See Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404, 1408–10 (C.D. Ill. 1992); see also Baxter v. 
Doe, 868 So. 2d 958, 961 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that vice-president of university was public 
official). 
 241. See Lassiter v. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (E.D. Ky. 2006). 
 242. See Hoskins v. Fuchs, 517 S.W.3d 834, 841–43 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 243. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Junior Coll. Dist. No. 508, 334 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex. 1969). 
 244. This division has not characterized plaintiffs occupying higher levels of authority in the 
public educations system, who are routinely deemed public officials. See, e.g., Garcia v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Socorro Consol. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1403, 1408 (10th Cir. 1985) (school board members); 
Ghafur v. Bernstein, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 634 (Ct. App. 2005) (superintendent of charter schools); 
Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (superintendent 
of public instruction); State v. Defley, 395 So. 2d 759, 761 (La. 1981) (school superintendent and 
school supervisor); Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 702–03 (Ohio 1986) (school 
superintendent); Strong v. Okla. Publ’g Co., 899 P.2d 1185, 1188–89 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) 
(school board vice president). 
 245. 523 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 246. Id. at 610. 
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as principals.”247 A federal court similarly seemed to hinge public 
official status on the nature of the defamatory speech at issue.248 In 
Stevens v. Tillman,249 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals asserted 
ipse dixit that the principal bringing suit was a public official before 
generically citing Rosenblatt without elaboration.250 For a Tennessee 
appeals court, the keys to a principal’s public official status were that 
she was an authority figure and a government representative to the 
students and parents with whom she dealt and that her actions affected 
the state’s taxpayers.251 In the logic of the Vermont Supreme Court, a 
principal is a public official “[b]ecause of the crucial role of public 
education in American society.”252 In Kapiloff v. Dunn,253 a Maryland 
appeals court somewhat ambiguously stated it was “plain” that the 
principal was within the “‘public figure-public official’ 
classification.”254 
While courts declining to recognize principals as public officials 
also vary somewhat in their analyses, what largely unites them is their 
relatively scant reliance on Rosenblatt’s indicia in reaching their 
conclusion. In Ellerbee v. Mills,255 for example, the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s entire discussion of Rosenblatt consisted of a recitation of the 
case’s language concerning responsibility and control amidst its 
review of several relevant precedents.256 Later, the court briefly stated 
its reasoning: 
[U]nder normal circumstances, a principal simply does not 
have the relationship with government to warrant “public 
official” status under New York Times. Principals, in general, 
are removed from the general conduct of government, and 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Johnson v. Robbinsdale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 827 F. Supp. 1439, 1441 (D. Minn. 
1993). 
 249. 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 250. See id. at 403 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85–86 (1966)). 
 251. Junior-Spence v. Keenan, No. 89-284-II, 1990 WL 17241, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 
1990). 
 252. Palmer v. Bennington Sch. Dist., 615 A.2d 498, 501 (Vt. 1992). 
 253. 343 A.2d 251 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
 254. Id. at 258; see also Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453, 456–58 (Miss. 1967) (declaring 
actual malice standard applicable to principal but not expressly designating plaintiff as public 
official under Rosenblatt). 
 255. 422 S.E.2d 539 (Ga. 1992). 
 256. See id. at 540 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)). 
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are not policymakers at the level intended by the New York 
Times designation of public official.257 
In East Canton Education Association v. McIntosh,258 the Ohio 
Supreme Court endorsed this position259 while referring to Rosenblatt 
even more obliquely.260 An Illinois appeals court mentioned 
Rosenblatt only when reviewing an earlier ruling that had cited 
Rosenblatt in deciding that three high school teachers who served as 
coaches must show actual malice.261 To explain its refusal to deem a 
principal a public official, the court later simply stated: “The 
relationship a public school . . . principal has with the conduct of 
government is far too remote . . . to justify exposing these individuals 
to a qualifiedly privileged assault upon his or her reputation.”262 An 
Indiana court quoted passages from Rosenblatt in its canvass of 
pertinent caselaw,263 but ultimately rejected public official status on 
the ground that the issues involved in the suit “do not concern broader 
education issues of public concern, but merely an internal, work-place 
dispute.”264 
B.  Hybrid Plaintiffs 
While the field of education offers the most prominent 
illustrations of divergent approaches to public official status, it is 
hardly the only area where this phenomenon appears. For example, 
even courts within the same state have reached opposite conclusions 
as to whether a deputy public defender is a public official.265 Most 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. 709 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1999). 
 259. Id. at 475 (quoting Ellerbee, 422 S.E.2d at 540). 
 260. See id. at 473–74 (noting that court had consulted Rosenblatt in previous decisions 
determining public official status of school superintendent and high school teacher/wrestling 
coach). 
 261. See McCutcheon v. Moran, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (citing Basarich 
v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)); see also Stevens v. Tillman, 568 F. Supp. 289, 
294 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding principal not to be public official on authority of McCutcheon). 
 262. McCutcheon, 425 N.E.2d at 1133. 
 263. See Beeching v. Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 676–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 264. Id. at 679. 
 265. Compare Tague v. Citizens for Law & Order, Inc., 142 Cal. Rptr. 689, 693 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1977) (the plaintiff’s “performance of [his] governmental duties, for the direct 
benefit of those for whom the government is legally responsible, is precisely the ‘conduct of 
government affairs’ deserving of public scrutiny that the court envisioned in Rosenblatt”), with 
James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890, 895 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It would be a 
gross overstatement to say that a deputy public defender has, or would appear to the public to have, 
‘substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.’” (quoting 
Mosesian v. McClatchy Newspapers, 252 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
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notable, however, is variation in the weight assigned to the private 
capacity of libel plaintiffs who also participate in government. Given 
scattered approaches to the question, it is difficult to forecast under 
what circumstances courts will adjudge the private dimension of such 
“hybrid” individuals as preclusive of public official designation. 
As noted earlier, formal employment in the private sector has not 
been deemed an absolute bar to characterization as a public official.266 
The most compelling circumstance for treating private individuals as 
public officials in libel suits is when the statement at issue comments 
on the conduct of the plaintiff while formerly serving in public office. 
Rosenblatt acknowledged that a situation might arise in which interest 
in such plaintiffs’ performance in office might have subsided to the 
point as to render the New York Times rule inapplicable.267 A review 
of reported cases, however, has not identified an example of this 
scenario.268 
A strong case for imposition of the actual malice standard can also 
be made where the plaintiff, though nominally a private individual, 
performs the functions of a particular public position. Thus, a Texas 
court found a lawyer who was retained by a city to serve as “City 
Attorney,” and who interacted in various ways with the public in that 
capacity, to possess the responsibility for or control over the conduct 
of governmental affairs that marks a public official.269 A California 
court similarly determined that the superintendent of privately 
operated charter schools qualified as a public official for libel purposes 
because the schools were considered part of the state’s public school 
system.270 
Even private actors who do not discharge the duties of an 
established public position may be designated public officials where 
they wield substantial influence within government. In Hatfill v. New 
York Times Co.,271 an expert in biological welfare working for a large 
government contracting firm had extensive input into federal defense 
 
 266. See Johnson v. Cap. City Press, Inc., 346 So. 2d 819, 821–22 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
 267. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 n.14 (1966). 
 268. More typical of courts’ disposition of this question is Victoria v. Le Blanc, 7 P.3d 668 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2000). There, the court rejected the argument by a former city administrator that the actual 
malice rule did not apply to letters written about her after her dismissal from office. Id. at 669–71. 
 269. See Rogers v. Cassidy, 946 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 270. See Ghafur v. Bernstein, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 628, 632–33 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 271. 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
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policies—for example, making recommendations to high-ranking 
government officials, developing training programs for several 
government agencies including the CIA, and receiving federal funds 
to work on defense programs of “national importance.”272 The nature 
and significance of his work, held the court, gave the public an 
“independent interest” in his qualifications and performance.273 Nor 
need private plaintiffs exert a potential impact comparable to Hatfill’s 
for their involvement to thrust public official status upon them. An 
architect and structural engineer engaged to design and construct a 
county building,274 the manager of a community center who owned the 
building the city rented for that purpose,275 and a county tag agent 
presumed to be an independent contractor276 were all ruled to fall 
within Rosenblatt’s conception of public officials. Under a 
comparable analysis, governmental delegation of significant authority 
to a private individual to control the lives of others can make the 
individual a public official when exercising this power. Under this 
reasoning, a California court applied the actual malice standard to a 
court-appointed conservator accused of abusing an elderly woman in 
her charge.277 
At the same time, other courts have displayed considerable 
reluctance to apply the actual malice standard to plaintiffs who have a 
foot in both the private and public spheres. Reminiscent of the 
Supreme Court’s state action doctrine,278 some courts evince deep 
skepticism that an individual whose primary responsibilities lie in the 
private realm can qualify as a public official in libel actions. In 
Mosesian v. McClatchy Newspapers,279 the court stated flatly that 
being in the government’s employ was “the condition precedent for 
‘public official.’”280 A New Mexico court refused to apply the actual 
 
 272. Id. at 528. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Turley v. W.T.A.X., Inc., 236 N.E.2d 778, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 275. See Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Mo. 1969). 
 276. Hodges v. Okla. J. Publ’g Co., 617 P.2d 191, 194 (Okla. 1980). 
 277. Young v. CBS Broad., Inc., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 240 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 278. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930–32 (2019); 
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157–64 (1978); see also Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1415–16 (2003) (noting narrow conception 
of private activities that constitute “public function” so as to deem private actors as engaging in 
state action subject to constitutional requirements). 
 279. 252 Cal. Rptr. 586 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 280. Id. at 594 (rejecting argument that man with an interest in an association licensed to 
manage horse races was a public official); see also Smith v. A Pocono Country Place Prop. Owners 
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malice rule to a member of a mayoral advisory committee because the 
committee’s members lacked “any official status.”281 
Though refraining from such categorical pronouncements, some 
courts have avoided designating plaintiffs as public officials on 
narrow or formalistic grounds. In Bufalino v. Associated Press,282 the 
Second Circuit declined to rule whether his position as a part-time 
borough solicitor made him a public official because articles alleging 
ties to organized crime did not identify him as an officeholder.283 The 
court was unmoved by the consideration that the charge, if true, would 
presumably bear on the plaintiff’s fitness as solicitor.284 In a variation 
of this reasoning, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the 
circumstance that a county coroner who performed an autopsy for 
another county was paid out of private funds for this service.285 To 
buttress the conclusion that the actual malice rule did not apply to 
statements about her performance during this episode, the court went 
on to note that, in any event, the plaintiff’s supervision by the other 
county’s coroner meant that she lacked the degree of responsibility or 
control needed to characterize her as a public official in the context of 
her suit.286 The Eighth Circuit likewise preferred not to rest its 
rejection of public official status for an informant to the police solely 
on the informant’s lack of formal government employment.287 Instead, 
the court asserted that the informant’s “minor role” in a government 
enterprise would have barred his classification as a public official 
anyway.288 
In other instances, the absence of government employment 
appears to operate more as a thumb than a fist on a scale that tilts 
against public official status. For example, an insurance agent who 
was appointed as a county’s “agent of record” for health and life 
 
Ass’n, 686 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (“Plaintiff was the General Manager of a private 
property development and, hence, cannot be characterized as a public official.”). 
 281. Furgason v. Clausen, 785 P.2d 242, 250 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989). 
 282. 692 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 283. See id. at 272–74. 
 284. See id. at 272. 
 285. See Michaelis v. CBS, Inc., 119 F.3d 697, 702 (8th Cir. 1997). This case is discussed at 
supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Michaelis, 119 F.3d at 702. 
 287. See Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004, 1006 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 288. Id. 
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insurance, advised the county on all health and life insurance matters, 
and served as plan administrator for the county’s deferred 
compensation plan289—and was conceded to have “a good deal of 
influence” over the county’s selection of health insurance programs 
for its employees290—was ruled not to meet the criteria for public 
officials. Although the Arizona court noted that the plaintiff was not a 
government employee, it justified its holding by pointing out that the 
county’s board of supervisors rather than the plaintiff made final 
decisions about insurance.291 A Louisiana court similarly referred to a 
plaintiff as a “private consulting engineer” but ultimately resolved his 
status on his insufficient responsibility for or control over the 
installation of a sound system of a specialized public school.292 In the 
same vein, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a private institute’s temporary 
role as consultant to a county water authority had not rendered it a 
public official because of the institute’s lack of formal authority.293 
In a final class of cases, courts’ withholding of public figure status 
from dual-nature plaintiffs appears to stem not from categorical 
resistance to characterizing such individuals in this way, but rather a 
well-grounded sense that a plaintiff’s position does not accord with 
Rosenblatt’s underlying intention. An example is a private attorney 
who is engaged to participate in a specific governmental activity. In 
Steere v. Cupp,294 the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
plaintiff had been acting as an officer of the court when he served as a 
court-appointed defense attorney in a murder trial.295 Neither this 
circumstance, however, nor his earlier participation in county 
government296 “afford[ed] him the opportunity to exercise . . . [the] 
sovereign power” necessary to qualify him as a public official in the 
context of an allegedly defamatory news story concerning his 
representation of the defendant.297 In Durham v. Cannan 
 
 289. Dombey v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 708 P.2d 742, 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), vacated in 
part on other grounds, 724 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1986). 
 290. Id. at 746. 
 291. See id. at 746–47. 
 292. See Forrest v. Lynch, 347 So. 2d 1255, 1256–58 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
 293. See Arctic Co. v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1980) (The Institute 
“had no control over the conduct of government affairs. It made no recommendations, participated 
in no policy determinations, and exercised no discretion”). 
 294. 602 P.2d 1267 (Kan. 1979). 
 295. Id. at 1272. 
 296. Steere had been county attorney and later special counsel for a county board in a dispute. 
Id. at 1273 (noting Steere’s public service as factors in finding him to be a public figure). 
 297. Id. at 1272. 
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Communications, Inc.,298 the link between defamatory statements 
about a private attorney and his earlier employment by government 
was even more attenuated. Appearing after the plaintiff had completed 
his service as special counsel for a court of inquiry, a news broadcast 
accused him of involvement with a house of prostitution.299 Because 
the charge had no bearing on the plaintiff’s conduct as a special 
prosecutor, the court refused to consider him a public official.300 
III.  PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES 
Under First Amendment doctrine, ascribing public official status 
to a plaintiff is not the only means of activating the actual malice 
standard. Designation as a public figure also imposes on plaintiffs the 
burden of showing that the defendant acted with knowledge or 
reckless disregard of falsity.301 In principle, the two kinds of “public” 
plaintiffs represent two distinct categories of individuals. As dealt with 
in some lower court reasoning, however, they intermingle in ways that 
tend to blur this distinction. 
The extension of New York Times’s actual malice requirement in 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts302 to those denominated public figures 
stemmed largely from a recognition that many persons who are not 
public officials nonetheless wield comparable power and influence. In 
his pivotal concurring opinion,303 Chief Justice Warren asserted that 
many individuals “who do not hold public office . . . are nevertheless 
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, 
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at 
 
 298. 645 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App. 1982). 
 299. See id. at 847. 
 300. Id. at 849; see Crane v. Ariz. Republic, 972 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he 
position of private attorney does not automatically invite public scrutiny. An attorney is not a 
governmental official, so heightened press scrutiny does not serve a watchdog function.”) In Crane, 
the court held that the former head of a city crime strike force was not a public official for the 
purpose of allegations of improper conduct subsequent to his service on the strike force. Id. at 1514, 
1524. 
 301. See infra notes 302–313 and accompanying text. 
 302. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 303. For an explanation of the configuration of opinions that produced the result in Butts, see 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 
SUP. CT. REV. 267, 275–78. 
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large.”304 Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,305 the Court articulated 
somewhat different rationales for requiring public figures to prove 
actual malice as well as a taxonomy of such individuals. Relative to 
private individuals—who were constitutionally required to show only 
negligence306—public figures, like public officials, generally have 
“greater access to the channels of effective communication” and can 
therefore more effectively rebut defamatory falsehoods.307 More 
importantly, public figures and public officials presumably accepted 
the risk of exposure to false accusations when they chose to engage in 
conduct that “invite[d] attention and comment.”308 Guided by these 
rationales, the Court identified two principal kinds of public figures.309 
Some individuals become public figures through their positions of 
“persuasive power and influence”;310 they thus attain this status by 
achieving “such pervasive fame or notoriety” that they become public 
figures for all purposes and in every context.311 In most cases, 
however, people become public figures by having "thrust themselves 
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence 
the resolution of the issues involved.”312 Having acquired their 
visibility in this specific manner, such persons assume the position of 
a public figure only for “a limited range of issues.”313 In subsequent 
decisions, the Court soon demonstrated the restricted basis for 
becoming a limited-purpose public figure. The Court ruled that public 
interest alone, even where the plaintiff engages the media, does not 
necessarily render a dispute a “public controversy”;314 that defendants 
 
 304. Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 163–64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 305. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 306. Id. at 347. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,751 
(1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that Gertz’s ruling that private figures must 
demonstrate actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages applies only to defamatory 
expressions about matters of public concern). 
 307. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 308. Id. at 344–45. 
 309. The Court also noted a third category of involuntary public figures but anticipated that 
such individuals would be “exceedingly rare.” Id. at 345. Caselaw has borne out this expectation. 
See Matthew Lafferman, Comment, Do Facebook and Twitter Make You a Public Figure?: How 
to Apply the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine to Social Media, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 199, 220 (2012) (“Courts have used this [involuntary public figure] doctrine so sparingly 
that some courts and commentators have questioned its existence altogether.”). 
 310. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
 311. See id. at 351. 
 312. Id. at 345. 
 313. Id. at 351. 
 314. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976) (holding that socialite’s convening 
of several press conferences to discuss her divorce proceedings did not make her a limited public 
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could not transform someone who had not invited attention or 
comment into a public figure by their own actions propelling the 
plaintiff into public consciousness;315 and that an individual’s 
conviction of a crime that draws media attention does not 
automatically make that person a public figure in the absence of 
voluntary participation in a public controversy.316 
Gertz’s application of rationales for the actual malice standard to 
both public figures and public officials obscures differences between 
these two categories as well as the distinct standard governing each. 
As a preliminary matter, it is difficult to gauge relative access to 
channels of communication in light of the Internet, social media, and 
other expansions in communicative capacity that have arisen since 
Gertz.317 Assuming that some classes of people can more readily 
summon public attention, however, this premise does not apply 
equally to both types of public plaintiffs. Virtually by definition, those 
who have attained “such pervasive fame or notoriety”318 as to 
constitute all-purpose public figures will presumably be able to reach 
a broad audience. Limited-purpose public figures, who have vaulted 
to “the forefront of particular public controversies,”319 are also likely 
to gain media attention when they respond to criticism arising from 
their participation in the controversy. Given the wide range of 
government employees who may be considered public officials under 
Rosenblatt,320 however, it seems dubious to assume that most of them 
will effectively gain the ear of the public when countering defamatory 
falsehoods. 
 
figure); see Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“A public 
controversy . . . must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some 
segment of it in an appreciable way. . . .   [A] public controversy is a dispute that in fact has received 
public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants.”). 
 315. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). 
 316. See Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 166–67 (1979). 
 317. See Benjamin Barron, A Proposal to Rescue New York Times v. Sullivan by Promoting a 
Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73, 89 (2007) (arguing that ability to reach large audiences 
through the Internet has undermined Court’s reasoning in Gertz); Usman, supra note 58, at 287 
(noting “four decades of technological change in access to media” as factor in calling Gertz 
rationales into question). 
 318. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
 319. Id. at 345. 
 320. See supra Section I.C. 
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These observations apply with even more force to the Court’s 
“normative consideration”321 that public plaintiffs have assumed the 
risk of harsh scrutiny by ascending into the public arena. While it is 
an exaggeration to say there is no such thing as bad publicity, the 
adage captures the reality that all-purpose public figures understand 
that rising to this level of prominence can entail severely critical 
inspection of their lives.322 Those who have elected to thrust 
themselves into the “vortex”323 of a public controversy should 
similarly expect intense focus and unfavorable commentary on their 
role.324 Public officials, on the other hand, should not be assumed to 
have undertaken the risk of public obloquy where they do not occupy 
a position of prominence.325 
Overlapping elements of the public official and public figure 
doctrines have given rise to a sometimes awkward or ambiguous 
coexistence between the two in some cases. Occasionally a court will 
appear simply to confuse or conflate the two concepts.326 In some 
instances, a court will redundantly—from the standpoint of requiring 
 
 321. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 352. 
 324. 2 EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Mr. Fox’s East India Bill (Dec. 1, 1783), in THE SPEECHES 
OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND IN 
WESTMINSTER HALL 406, 488 (1816) (“[C]alumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph.”). 
 325. See Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1657, 1666 (1987) (“In few of these cases [where courts have held lower-level government 
employees to be public officials] could one honestly say that the plaintiff either had access to the 
media to respond or had assumed the risk.”). 
 326. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff 
“was a public figure and . . . the challenged statements relate to his official conduct” (emphasis 
added)); Wilkinson v. Schoenhorn, No. CV 960565559S, 1999 WL 203750, at *3 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 24, 1999) (“‘Public figure’ includes public officials . . . and have been held to include such 
persons as a public school teacher [and] a police officer . . . .” (internal citations omitted)); 
Abdelsayed v. Narumanchi, 668 A.2d 378, 380 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (referring to plaintiff as 
“public figure” in course of finding him to be public official); Ducklow v. KSTP-TV, LLC, Nos. 
A13-1279, A13-1280, A13-1281, 2014 WL 802515, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2014) (citing 
case holding that a public schoolteacher is a “public official” to support ruling that public 
schoolteachers are treated as “public teachers”); Frensley v. Newschannel 5 Network, No. 11C-
1390, 2013 Tenn. Cir. LEXIS 690, at *2 (Mar. 22, 2013) (“It is undisputed that the plaintiff, a 
school teacher, is a ‘public figure’ for purposes of determining the standard for establishing the 
essential elements of defamation and false light invasion of privacy.”); MediaOne, L.L.C. v. 
Henderson, 592 S.W.3d 933, 942 (Tex. App. 2019) (“[The plaintiff], as a former public official 
[police chief], was a public figure with respect to the publication of The Monitor’s original article 
because less than two years had passed between his resignation and the defamatory statements.” 
(emphases added)); O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2007) (reviewing 
discussion of public figures in Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), to support ruling 
that plaintiff was public official). 
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actual malice—find a plaintiff to be both a public official and public 
figure.327 In others, the court—perhaps hedging—will state that the 
plaintiff falls into at least one of these categories.328 In still another 
variation, a court concluding that the plaintiff cannot be a public 
official will rest the application of the actual malice rule squarely on 
designation as a public figure.329 Somewhat more curiously, courts 
sometimes characterize as public figures plaintiffs who seem readily 
to lend themselves to public official status. In a suit brought by a 
university’s associate dean of students, the court devoted extended 
analysis to conclude that he was a limited-purpose public figure.330 
Police officers, perhaps among the government employees most 
frequently classified as public officials in libel cases,331 have 
nonetheless instead been treated as public figures from time to time.332 
Finally, the courts that most clearly display a firm grasp of the 
distinction between public officials and public figures are arguably 
those that find the plaintiff to qualify as neither.333 By so ruling, they 
demonstrate their understanding that only by excluding the plaintiff 
from either category can application of the actual malice standard be 
precluded. 
Complicating the distinction between public officials and public 
figures is the tendency by some courts to treat Gertz’s rationales for 
distinguishing between public persons and private figures as criteria 
for determining individual plaintiffs’ status. Gertz itself 
 
 327. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); 
Nothstein v. U.S. Cycling, 499 F. Supp. 3d 101, 125 (E.D. Pa. 2020); Demby v. English, 667 So. 
2d 350, 354–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam); Luper v. Black Dispatch Publ’g Co., 675 
P.2d 1028, 1031 (Okla. Civ. App. 1983). 
 328. Hicks v. Stone, 425 So. 2d 807, 813 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (“[W]e find that Dr. Hicks is a 
public official, or at least a public figure . . . .”); Romero v. Abbeville Broad. Serv., Inc., 420 So. 
2d 1247, 1250 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (“[P]laintiff was a public officer and/or a public figure for 
purposes of fixing the burden of proof.”). 
 329. See, e.g., Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1272–73 (Kan. 1979); Grayson v. Curtis Publ’g 
Co., 436 P.2d 756, 762 (Wash. 1967). 
 330. See Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 869–71 (W.D. Va. 2016); Eidson 
v. Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (referring to city attorney as “public figure”). 
 331. See infra Section IV.A. 
 332. See, e.g., Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840, 848–49 (8th Cir. 2002); Sparks 
v. Thurmond, 319 S.E.2d 46, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); see also El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 
S.W.2d 403, 404–05 (Tex. 1969) (viewing public university professor as public figure). 
 333. See, e.g., Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653, 663–64 (Idaho 2019); Beeching v. Levee, 
764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Sellars v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 684 P.2d 450, 453–
56 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). 
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acknowledged that its observations about access to media and 
assumption of risk were “generalities” that would not obtain in every 
instance where plaintiffs were deemed public figures or public 
officials.334 Nevertheless, the Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire335 in 
finding Hutchinson to be a private figure observed that he lacked the 
“regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the 
accouterments of having become a public figure.”336 It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that a number of courts have conflated Gertz’s 
justifications for requiring public officials to show actual malice and 
the means by which such persons are identified. In ruling that a public 
schoolteacher was not a public official, the Virginia Supreme Court in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb,337 compared the plaintiff to 
Elmer Gertz, the attorney who the United States Supreme Court had 
ruled was neither a public official nor a public figure.338 The court 
observed that “attorneys have significantly more access than teachers 
to the media and a more realistic opportunity to answer false charges 
about their competence.”339 The court also cited the risk an individual 
takes of close public scrutiny as an element to be weighed in deciding 
whether a particular public employee is one classified as a “public 
official.”340 Although the court went on to state that the teacher did not 
hold a position recognized by Rosenblatt as that of a public official,341 
this discussion did not negate the court’s importation of Gertz’s 
justifications into its analysis. The Utah Supreme Court in O’Connor 
v. Burningham342 also seemed to elevate the role of Gertz’s reasoning. 
Though the court found that the plaintiff’s position did not possess the 
 
 334. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
 335. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
 336. Id. at 136; see also Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 170–71 (1979) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that lapse of 16 years between plaintiff’s participation in event 
giving rise to alleged falsehood about him and publication of book containing defamatory statement 
eroded whatever access to media and “risk of public scrutiny” might be ascribed to plaintiff at time 
of event (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 337. 362 S.E.2d 32 (Va. 1987). 
 338. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52. 
 339. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 362 S.E.2d at 36; see Mandel v. Boston Phx., Inc., 456 F.3d 
198, 204 (1st Cir., 2006) (The public-official determination generally “tak[es] into account: (i) the 
extent to which the inherent attributes of a position define it as one of influence over issues of 
public importance; (ii) the position’s special access to the media as a means of self-help; and (iii) 
the risk of diminished privacy assumed upon taking the position.”). 
 340. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 362 S.E.2d at 36. 
 341. See id. at 37 (citing Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13). 
 342. 165 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2007). 
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“apparent importance” needed to make him a public official,343 crucial 
to its reasoning was the question of assumption of risk. Unlike higher-
level public education administrators, who “likely surrendered no 
small portion of their ability to protect their reputations,” coaches and 
teachers like the plaintiff “struck no such bargain.”344 In addition, a 
Washington court went further and appeared to place Gertz’s 
considerations of media access and assumption of risk at center stage 
in its analysis of the plaintiff's status: “[T]he most important factor 
distinguishing public and private plaintiffs is the assumption of the 
risk of greater public scrutiny of public life. . . . Of secondary 
importance is the public plaintiff’s ease of access to the press.”345 
Other courts have blended Rosenblatt’s tests and Gertz’s 
rationales to formulate their standards for identifying public officials. 
In Mosesian v. McClatchy Newspapers,346 a California court 
promulgated a four-part definition of public official. Three of the 
prongs echoed passages from Rosenblatt, while the fourth tracked 
Gertz in stating that a public official “usually enjoys significantly 
greater access to the mass media and therefore a more realistic 
opportunity to contradict false statements than the private 
individual.”347 After quoting extensively from Rosenblatt, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Kassel v. Gannett Co., Inc.348 set forth 
access to media and assumption of risk as two of the three legs of the 
“stool” to which it would look to ascertain whether a plaintiff was a 
public official.349 In True v. Ladner,350 the Maine Supreme Court also 
recited passages from Rosenblatt before additionally stressing 
schoolteachers’ lack of media access and their non-assumption of risk 
 
 343. Id. at 1218–19 (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86). 
 344. Id. at 1220. 
 345. Eubanks v. N. Cascades Broad., 61 P.3d 368, 373 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Clawson 
v. Longview Publ’g Co., 589 P.2d 1223 (Wash. 1979)). After discussing the roles that media access 
and assumption of risk would play in determining the plaintiff’s status, Clawson, 589 P.2d at 1226–
27, the Washington Supreme Court had later quoted Rosenblatt’s descriptions of public officials, 
id. at 1227–28. However, the Eubanks court’s implicit interpretation of the latter as more-or-less 
an afterthought appears plausible. 
 346. 252 Cal. Rptr. 586 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 347. See id. at 593; accord James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890, 895 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
 348. 875 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 349. See id. at 939–40. 
 350. 513 A.2d 257, 264 (Me. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Gomes 
v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 41–42 (D. Me. 2005). 
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as reasons for not classifying them as public officials.351 In a kind of 
mirror image to Ladner, a Connecticut court concluded that a teacher 
is a public official under Rosenblatt, and then optimistically added that 
the media would probably give teachers charged with misconduct both 
opportunity and encouragement to respond.352 
IV.  PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE QUEST FOR RULES 
The tension between the stability of fixed rules and the 
adaptability of more flexible standards is old and indeed inherent in 
law.353 Determination of whether a government employee in a 
defamation suit must prove actual malice embodies this dilemma. 
Under Rosenblatt, a court has broad latitude to assess whether a 
government position entails the responsibility, control, or apparent 
importance to brand its holder a public official.354 Rosenblatt’s general 
indicia of public official status amount to a standard; indeed, the Court 
does not purport to be promulgating a rule.355 Compounding this 
imprecision is the wide latitude afforded courts under Garrison to 
decide whether the defamatory statement at issue bears on an official’s 
fitness for office.356 At the same time, the impulse persists to develop 
a framework that avoids endless ad hoc decision-making within the 
blurred parameters of the Rosenblatt-Garrison regime. Thus, patterns 
can be discerned in which courts have apparently adopted a nearly 
irrebuttable presumption of public official status for certain classes of 
government employees.357 In addition, proposals have been advanced 
for a more specific test to gauge the appropriateness of applying the 
actual malice rule.358 As with other doctrines, however, courts cannot 
impose more certainty than the subject can bear. Inevitably, courts will 
sometimes consult their sense of whether a libel plaintiff on balance 
 
 351. See id. at 263–64; see also Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653, 663–64 (Idaho 2019) (“A 
schoolteacher or coach is not situated better than a private citizen to combat falsehoods. [The 
plaintiff] lacked access to a bully pulpit . . . so any influence [the plaintiff] could have had to defend 
his reputation as a public schoolteacher would be minuscule.”). 
 352. See Kelley v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (Conn. 1992). 
 353. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing how Supreme Court 
Justices’ divergent views on use of fixed rules versus flexible standards affected constitutional 
analysis and decisional outcomes in the Court’s 1991 term). 
 354. See supra Section I.C. 
 355. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. 
 357. See infra Section IV.A 
 358. See infra Section IV.B. 
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“deserves” to be subjected to the actual malice requirement. At least 
some courts have intimated as much. 
A.  The Case of Police Officers 
Aside from obvious positions like governor and senator, 
Rosenblatt appears to call for an individualized determination of 
public official status tailored to the authority and perceived 
importance of the plaintiff. Recurring libel suits by certain classes of 
government employees, however, have encouraged the search for 
categorical resolution of their designation. In the case of some 
employees like public schoolteachers, no consensus has been 
reached.359 For at least one kind of employee, however, courts appear 
to have arrived at a virtually per se rule of public official status: police 
officers.360 The rationales for regarding police officers as public 
officials have been well-stated by courts. In the oft-cited case of Gray 
v. Udevitz,361 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared: 
The cop on the beat is the member of the department who is 
most visible to the public. He possesses both the authority 
and the ability to exercise force. Misuse of his authority can 
result in significant deprivation of constitutional rights and 
personal freedoms, not to mention bodily injury and financial 
loss. The strong public interest in ensuring open discussion 
and criticism of his qualifications and job performance 
warrant the conclusion that he is a public official.362 
In another frequently quoted passage—involving a patrol 
officer363 but elsewhere applied to police officers364—the Illinois 
Supreme Court observed: 
[L]aw enforcement is a primary function of local government 
and . . . the public has a far greater interest in the 
qualifications and conduct of law enforcement officers, even 
 
 359. See supra Section II.A. 
 360. Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. See, e.g., Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217, 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
 364. See, e.g., Opaitz v. Gannaway Web Holdings, LLC, 454 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App. 2014); 
Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000); Smith v. Russell, 456 So. 2d 462, 
464 (Fla. 1984). 
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at, and perhaps especially at, an ‘on the street’ level than in 
the qualifications and conduct of other comparably low-
ranking government employees performing more proprietary 
functions. The abuse of a patrolman’s office can have great 
potentiality for social harm . . . .365 
The credence given such reasoning is attested by the 
overwhelming number of cases in which courts have classified police 
officers as public officials.366 Members of police departments in 
higher positions, though some may lack the visibility of officers on the 
beat, are also routinely assigned this status.367 Moreover, while the 
structure of federalism precludes imposition of a uniform rule absent 
a Supreme Court edict, it is common for courts to treat the designation 
 
 365. Coursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publ’g Corp., 239 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ill. 1968); see Smith, 
456 So. 2d at 464 (A police officer “[i]s a highly visible representative of government authority 
who has power over citizens and broad discretion in the exercise of that power. . . . Most citizens 
are interested in the qualifications and performance of policemen . . . .”); Rotkiewicz, 730 N.E.2d 
at 287 (“[B]ecause of the broad powers vested in police officers and the great potential for abuse 
of those powers, as well as police officers’ high visibility within and impact on a community . . . 
[police officers] are ‘public officials’ for purposes of defamation.”); Opaitz, 454 S.W.3d at 66 (“The 
public perceives a police officer as an authority figure entrusted in upholding the law and possesses 
a legitimate interest in information related to his ability to follow the law and perform his duty to 
protect the public.”). 
 366. E.g., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 572 P.2d 1258, 1261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977); 
Rattray v. City of Nat’l City, 51 F.3d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1994); McKinley v. Baden, 777 F.2d 1017, 
1021 (5th Cir. 1985); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377, 386 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985); Ethridge v. N. Miss. Commc’ns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 347, 351 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Gomes 
v. Fried, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (Ct. App. 1982); Moriarty v. Lippe, 294 A.2d 326, 334 (Conn. 
1972); Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971); Harrison v. Williams, 430 So. 2d 585, 
585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Pierce v. Pac. & S. Co., 303 S.E.2d 316, 318–19 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1983); Angelo v. Brenner, 406 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publ’g 
Co., 464 A.2d 161, 165 (Me. 1983); Shafer v. Lamar Publ’g Co., 621 S.W.2d 709, 710–11 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1981); Marchiano v. Sandman, 428 A.2d 541, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Orr 
v. Lynch, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (App. Div. 1978), aff’d, 383 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1978); McNabb 
v. Oregonian Publ’g Co., 685 P.2d 458, 460 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Dellinger v. Belk, 238 S.E.2d 
788, 789 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Dunlap v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6, 8 n.1 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1982); McClain v. Arnold, 270 S.E.2d 124, 125 (S.C. 1980); see MediaOne, L.L.C. v. 
Henderson, 592 S.W.3d 933, 941 (Tex. App. 2019) (“Police officers and other law enforcement 
officials are almost always held to be public officials.”). 
 367. See, e.g., Thuma v. Hearst Corp., 340 F. Supp. 867, 869 (D. Md. 1972) (captain); Rosales 
v. City of Eloy, 593 P.2d 688, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (sergeant); Jackson, 281 A.2d at 605 
(sergeant); Goolsby v. Wilson, 246 S.E.2d 371, 372 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (chief); Moore v. Streit, 
537 N.E.2d 408, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (chief); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So. 2d 1306, 1307–08 
(La. 1978) (chief); Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 762 (Me. 1981) (detective); Tomkiewicz v. 
Detroit News, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 36, 42–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (lieutenant); Mahnke v. Nw. 
Publ’ns, Inc., 160 N.W.2d 1, 2, 6–7 (Minn. 1968) (detective captain); Ramacciotti, 550 S.W.2d at 
221, 225 (sergeant); Costello v. Ocean Cnty. Observer, 643 A.2d 1012, 1021–22 (N.J. 1994) 
(lieutenant); Starr v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 201 S.E.2d 911, 913 (W. Va. 1974) (sergeant); 
Pronger v. O’Dell, 379 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (chief). 
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of police officers as public officials as an established judicial fact.368 
Nor has this logic been confined to members of the police department. 
Public official status has also been accorded to highway patrol 
officers,369 deputy sheriffs,370 correctional officers,371 and other 
government personnel with enforcement responsibilities.372 
B.  Alternative Approaches: A Sliding Scale 
Under Supreme Court rulings, the framework for determining 
whether a government employee must satisfy the actual malice 
requirement comprises two distinct phases: (1) ascertaining whether 
the plaintiff’s position intrinsically is the kind contemplated by 
Rosenblatt, and (2) deciding whether the defamatory falsehood related 
to the plaintiff’s official conduct or bore on the plaintiff’s fitness for 
 
 368. See, e.g., McKinley, 777 F.2d at 1021 (“Federal courts have consistently held police 
officials to be public officials for the purposes of the [New York Times] rule.”); Gray, 656 F.2d at 
591 (“Police officials have uniformly been treated as public officials within the meaning of New 
York Times.”); Coughlin, 603 F. Supp. at 385 (“Courts have consistently treated police officers as 
public officials within the meaning of New York Times.”); Gomes v. Fried, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 610 
(“Courts have uniformly held that a . . . low-level police officer is a ‘public official’ for the purpose 
of the New York Times privilege.”); Smith v. Danielczyk, 928 A.2d 795, 805 (Md. 2007) (“[I]t 
appears to be well-settled . . . that police officers, from patrol officers to chiefs, are regarded for 
New York Times purposes as public officials.”); Rotkiewicz, 730 N.E.2d at 288 (finding plaintiff 
police officer to be public official “in line with the vast majority of other jurisdictions”); Starr, 201 
S.E.2d at 913 (“[C]ourts throughout the land . . . declare police officers to be public officials as 
defined in the New York Times case.”). 
 369. E.g., Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987, 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Nat’l Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Colored People v. Moody, 350 So. 2d 1365, 1369 (Miss. 1977) (erroneously using 
term “public figure”). 
 370. E.g., Romero v. Abbeville Broad. Serv., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (La. Ct. App. 1982); 
Ammerman, 572 P.2d at 1261; Dally v. Orange Cnty. Publ’ns, 497 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (App. Div. 
1986); Cline v. Brown, 210 S.E.2d 446, 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); Murray v. Lineberry, 69 S.W.3d 
560, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 371. Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 924 (D.C. 2001); Stewart v. Sun Sentinel 
Co., 695 So. 2d 360, 361–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Sweeney v. Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of 
N.Y., Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (App. Div. 1989); Lyons v. State, No. 01-A-01-9304-BC-00160, 
1993 WL 414840, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1993). 
 372. Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977) (federal drug enforcement agent); 
Selby v. Savard, 655 P.2d 342, 344–45 (Ariz. 1982) (state’s assistant superintendent of liquor 
enforcement); Lewis v. Oliver, 873 P.2d 668, 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (FAA safety inspector); 
Demby v. English, 667 So. 2d 350, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (county director of 
animal control); McAvoy v. Shufrin, 518 N.E.2d 513, 516 n.3 (Mass. 1988) (constable) (basing 
public official designation on plaintiff’s declining to contest that status); Britton v. Koep, 470 
N.W.2d 518, 523–24 (Minn. 1991) (county probation officer); Angel v. Ward, 258 S.E.2d 788, 791 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (IRS agent). 
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the position.373 To some, however, the framework provides 
insufficient direction to courts or protection of the private dimensions 
of public employees’ lives. Thus, proposals have been advanced for 
deciding whether a government employee must prove actual malice 
by means other than the Court’s two discrete inquiries. In particular, a 
more holistic approach that focuses on the relationship between a 
plaintiff’s place in the government hierarchy and the nature of the 
conduct falsely attributed to the plaintiff has been thought to more 
equitably and predictably resolve this arena’s underlying tension 
between freedom to comment on government and states’ interest in 
protecting reputation. 
Under one notable proposal, courts would apply a kind of sliding 
scale in which the level of the plaintiff’s position would determine the 
scope of defamatory statements shielded by the actual malice 
barrier.374 Thus, much like an all-purpose public figure,375 an official 
at the apex of the government hierarchy would be required to show 
actual malice regardless of the conduct with which the official has 
been falsely charged.376 As positions descend from this pinnacle, 
however, the more evident should be the nexus between the 
government employee’s position and the alleged conduct for the actual 
malice rule to apply.377 This calibration, too, finds a parallel in public 
figure doctrine; it has been observed that when courts assess whether 
a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure, “the more important the 
controversy, the lower will be the threshold of the involvement needed 
to qualify as having ‘thrust’ oneself to the controversy’s forefront.”378 
At the lowest level of government employees, the closeness of this 
relationship would become irrelevant because of an irrebuttable 
presumption that no false charge would suffice to activate the actual 
 
 373. See infra Section I.A. 
 374. See Finkelson, supra note 35, at 894–907. 
 375. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 532 F.3d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A] public official . . . 
must always meet the actual malice standard . . . .” (emphasis added)); Davidson v. Baird, 438 P.3d 
928, 940 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (“[A]ll allegedly defamatory statements about an all-purpose public 
figure must be made with actual malice in order to be actionable.” (emphasis added)). 
 376. See Finkelson, supra note 35, at 899. 
 377. See id. at 901–03. Rodney Smolla has suggested the possibility of a similar kind of 
approach: “[a] type of pyramid analysis . . . with public officials at the high end of the policymaking 
hierarchy receiving only a narrow area of reserved privacy, but officials at the low end of the 
hierarchy enjoying a substantial degree of what will essentially be private figure status.” Smolla, 
supra note 65, at 1568. 
 378. Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 
1027, 1053 (1996) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)). 
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malice standard.379 To locate an employee’s position in government, 
the proposal would reverse the relative relevance of Rosenblatt and 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.380 under current Supreme Court 
doctrine.381 Determination of rank would take into account “character 
of employment,” “access to means of self-help,” and “assumed 
risk.”382 
Whatever the merits of this kind of standard, no discernible trend 
has arisen to abandon the Rosenblatt framework without the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, such proposals 
prompt speculation of whether courts are already weighing such 
considerations sub silentio under the rubric of Rosenblatt’s verbiage. 
That question in turn implicates the larger debate of the extent to 
which formal legal tests constrain judicial latitude or simply offer 
a facade for decisions arrived at on more equitable or outcome-
oriented grounds.383 The broader issue is of course unresolvable, 
but determination of public official status offers a helpful 
illustration of this tension. That examination follows below. 
C.  Rosenblatt and Normative Judicial Decision-making 
The potential for courts to resolve public official status as much 
on their sense of whether the government employee should be required 
to show actual malice, as on conformity to Rosenblatt’s prescriptions, 
finds stimulation in Rosenblatt itself. Because the Court’s opinion 
 
 379. See Finkelson, supra note 35 at 903. 
 380. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 381. See supra Section III and accompanying text. 
 382. Finkelson, supra note 35, at 895 (quoting Kassel v. Gannett Co., Inc., 875 F.2d 935, 940 
(1st Cir. 1989)). 
 383. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 61 (2003) (“The 
dubious aspect of separation-of-powers thinking is the idea that judges are not to make law (that 
being the legislature’s prerogative) but merely to apply it. . . . But in interpreting the Constitution 
and statutes as well, judges make up much of the law that they are purporting to be merely 
applying.”); Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, 
the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 362 (2003) 
(“Citation to authority or legal principle [by the Supreme Court] is often a rationalization for a 
conclusion already reached, a ‘game’ designed to decoy analysts into thinking that the decisions 
are other than politically motivated and equal in effect . . . to the decisions of legislators.”); Martin 
Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994) (“[Courts] must always 
deny their authority to make law, even when they are making law. . . . I call it lying. Courts and 
judges always lie. Lying is the nature of the judicial activity.”). 
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does not purport to offer a comprehensive definition,384 it leaves 
interstices that courts may wish to fill with their own interpretation of 
the values at stake. Such an approach need not be viewed as outright 
defiance of Rosenblatt; these values can be drawn from principles 
identified by the Court as underlying the indicia of public official 
status it set forth. Almost ritualistically, for example, the Rosenblatt 
Court quoted the New York Times declaration that the First 
Amendment embodies “a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open, and that [such debate] may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials.”385 The Court further observed that there exists “a 
strong interest in debate on public issues”;386 that “[c]riticism of 
government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area 
of free discussion”;387 that “[c]riticism of those responsible for 
government operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself 
be penalized”;388 and that “when interests in public discussion are 
particularly strong . . . the Constitution limits the protections afforded 
by the law of defamation.”389 
Much as some courts treat Gertz’s rationales for subjecting public 
officials to the actual malice rule as criteria for their identification,390 
they may be tempted to employ Rosenblatt’s conceptual foundations 
as free-floating principles for deciding whether a certain government 
employee should have to prove actual malice. It is impossible, of 
course, to know when courts may be incanting Rosenblatt’s 
descriptions while actually arriving at their decision through 
assessment of the just balance of broader First Amendment 
interests.391 Nevertheless, courts apparently do not universally view 
 
 384. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
 385. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. at 86. 
 390. See supra notes 334–352 and accompanying text. 
 391. Such exposition of reasoning is hardly unknown in the law. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 132 (10th ed. 2011) (asserting that courts often decide whether to classify an 
enterprise as a joint venture or partnership according to which would produce a more desirable 
result in the case); see also State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (“We see no profit in 
trying to decide upon a conventional category and then forcing the present subject into it. That 
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Rosenblatt as cabining their discretion in determining a plaintiff’s 
status. Perhaps the strongest indication of this phenomenon is those 
cases in which courts conclude that the plaintiff is a public official 
without reference to Rosenblatt at all.392 Granted, it is conceivable that 
at least some of these courts simply believe that the government 
employee’s status is so self-evident or well-established that no 
analytical rigor is necessary. Still, the omission of the Supreme 
Court’s dominant authority on the question leaves ample room for the 
inference that such courts are deeming plaintiffs public officials 
because—at bottom–on balance they ought to be held to the actual 
malice standard. 
Further evidence that such post hoc classification sometimes 
occurs can be found in cases in which courts offer public figure status 
as an alternative basis for requiring a government employee to show 
actual malice.393 A conspicuous example of a court’s determination to 
apply the actual malice rule whatever plaintiff’s label is needed is 
Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc.394 There, an investigator 
employed by the City of Miami brought suit over a television editorial 
on his testimony before the City Commission.395 The court’s opinion 
took pains to cover every principal basis for holding the plaintiff to the 
actual malice standard without definitively committing to any: 
Whether he was a public official, a public figure, or whether 
he simply involved himself in a matter of public interest, or 
whether his appearance and testimony before the Miami City 
 
approach would be artificial and distorting. The quest is for a fair adjustment of the competing 
needs of the parties, in the light of the realities of the relationship between the [parties].”). 
 392. See, e.g., Zurita v. V.I. Daily News, 578 F. Supp. 306, 308 (D.V.I. 1984); Thuma v. Hearst 
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 867, 869 (D. Md. 1972); Goolsby v. Wilson, 246 S.E.2d 371, 372 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1978); McCarney v. Des Moines Reg. & Trib. Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 155–56 (Iowa 1976); City of 
Natchitoches v. Emps. Reinsurance Corp., 819 So. 2d 413, 418 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Johnson v. 
Cap. City Press, Inc., 346 So. 2d 819, 821 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Malerba v. Newsday, 406 N.Y.S.2d 
552, 554 (App. Div. 1978); Silbowitz v. Lepper, 299 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566–67 (App. Div. 1969); 
McClain v. Arnold, 270 S.E.2d 124, 125 (S.C. 1980); Lyons v. State, No. 01-A-01-9304-BC-
00160, 1993 WL 414840, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 1993); Eubanks v. N. Cascades Broad., 61 
P.3d 368, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); Starr v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 201 S.E.2d 911, 913 
(W. Va. 1974); see also Bishop v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 235 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1970) (finding actual malice rule applicable without unequivocally stating that plaintiff was public 
official). 
 393. See supra notes 327–328 and accompanying text. 
 394. 235 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (per curiam). 
 395. Id. at 759. 
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Commission was a matter of public interest, it is clear that 
the rule in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applies . . . .396 
Such reasoning appears to flow from an underlying belief that the 
tenet that speech on public matters lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment397 is significantly implicated, with the proper category for 
justifying the actual malice rule a secondary consideration. 
Additionally, some opinions reflect express engagement with 
open-ended First Amendment themes and balancing of interests that 
transcend Rosenblatt’s distinct touchstones of responsibility, control, 
and apparent importance. In reviewing a defamation claim by school 
board members, the Tenth Circuit ultimately determined that “[t]he 
strong public interest in ensuring open discussion of their job 
performance warrants the conclusion that school board members are 
public officials.”398 More sweepingly, a California appeals court—
after noting that “public defenders, as integral components of [the 
criminal justice] system, are appropriate targets for scrutiny as to their 
qualifications and performances”—was directed to its conclusion that 
a deputy public defender was a public official by the “constitutional 
policy” that “any doubt as to the public status of a government 
employee should be resolved in favor of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ guarantees of freedom of the press and the public’s 
interest in open criticism of government operations.”399 
Other courts have introduced into their analysis specific factors 
that, while not directly contradicting Rosenblatt, extrapolate liberally 
from that opinion’s guidelines.400 After reciting passages from 
Rosenblatt, a Massachusetts appeals court added: “Other relevant 
considerations include the employee’s remuneration and duties, his or 
 
 396. Id. at 761 (internal citations omitted). 
 397. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[T]he Court has frequently reaffirmed 
that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy [sic] of First Amendment 
values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); 
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) (“This Court has emphasized 
that the First Amendment ‘embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all 
matters of public concern.’”) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940)); 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (“The public interest in having free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free Speech 
Clause . . . .”). 
 398. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Socorro Consol. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1403, 1408 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(per curiam). 
 399. Tague v. Citizens for Law & Order, Inc., 142 Cal. Rptr. 689, 693–94 (App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. 1977). 
 400. Id. 
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her participation in decisions on public issues, the impact of the 
government position on everyday life, the potential for social harm 
from abuse of the government position, and the employee’s access to 
the press.”401 The Tennessee Supreme Court expounded its own 
expansive interpretation of government employment whose holder is 
a public official: “[a]ny position . . . that carries with it duties and 
responsibilities affecting the lives, liberty, money or property of a 
citizen or that may enhance or disrupt his enjoyment of life, his peace 
and tranquility, or that of his family.”402 And a Louisiana court, 
equating the First Amendment concept of public official with a “public 
officer” under state law, declared the latter term to encompass those 
instances where “the Constitution or an act of the Legislature creates 
a position, fixes the compensation therefor, and prescribes the duties 
thereof, and these duties, not occasional or temporary in character but 
of a continuing and permanent nature, pertain to the public.”403 
CONCLUSION 
Admittedly, significant aspects of the public official doctrine 
cannot fairly be called enigmatic. These include the premier place of 
Rosenblatt and Garrison as authority in this area; the general tendency 
by courts to take an expansive view of these decisions, and thus of 
libel of government employees subject to the actual malice 
requirement; and the undeniable presence of inconsistences among 
courts in the designation of certain classes of government employees. 
Nevertheless, decades of judicial grappling with this question have left 
genuine questions about the meaning and direction of standards by 
which occasions for applying the New York Times rule will be 
resolved. Both the imperfect clarity of current jurisprudence and a 
sense that prevailing interpretations leave public employees too 
vulnerable to libel may induce the Supreme Court to revisit the 
doctrine. Such a development would have precedent: in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.,404 the Court both formally catalogued the various 
kinds of defamation plaintiffs and narrowed the scope of the actual 
 
 401. Netherwood v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Loc. 1725, 757 N.E.2d 257, 
262–63 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). 
 402. Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 441 (Tenn. 1978). 
 403. Cherry v. Hall, 270 So. 2d 626, 628 (La. Ct. App. 1972). 
 404. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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malice rule.405 Until such time, courts will continue to decide 
government employees’ status in defamation suits by criteria at which 
future litigants must guess. 
  
 
 405. See supra notes 305–313 and accompanying text. 
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